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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) began recognizing the protection of animals as a legitimate
objective that can justify trade restrictions. Scholars and animal
welfare organizations have written extensively about the WTO’s
negative impact on animal welfare legislation. Almost since the
WTO was established, animal welfare organizations have been
sounding the alarm and arguing that the free trade rules focus almost
entirely on ensuring that trade flows as smoothly as possible and
leaving little room for protecting animals. 1 One example used by
1. See, e.g., Peter Stevenson, The Greatest Threat Facing Animal Protection
Today: Post Cancun Briefing, WORLD TRADE ORG. 1 (Oct. 2003),
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animal welfare groups relates to the WTO concept of “like”
products. Non-discrimination between similar or “like” products is
one of the WTO’s bedrock principles. As has been well-chronicled
and lamented, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body’s interpretation of
like products has completely ignored “processes and production
methods” in the analysis. 2 For WTO purposes, this means an egg is
an egg, whether it comes from a hen kept in a cramped battery cage
or one allowed to forage freely in the yard, and no WTO member
may discriminate between eggs produced in different countries.
This interpretation impedes animal welfare regulations in
production industries because countries often aim to improve animal
welfare by prohibiting certain production methods. A country will be
hesitant to pass an industry-practice ban that applies only to
domestically-produced products because it may place domestic
producers at a disadvantage against foreign producers that are able to
produce the products more cheaply using the inhumane practice in
question. However, also applying the ban to imported products will
likely cause much handwringing among legislators because of the
WTO’s perceived approach toward discrimination.
The European Union’s (“E.U.”) recent legislation epitomizes the
dilemma that States face when trying to implement animal welfare
regulations without violating WTO rules. Although the E.U. is
arguably the most progressive government in the world in terms of

https://www.ciwf.org.uk/includes/documents/cm_docs/2008/p/post_cancun_mep_
briefing.pdf (“[T]he WTO rules are blocking progress on animal protection that
would otherwise be made – progress that is justified by scientific research and
wanted by much of the public is often simply not happening because of the WTO’s
destructive influence.”); see also Leesteffy Jenkins & Robert Stumberg, Animal
Protection in a World Dominated by the World Trade Organization, in THE STATE
OF THE ANIMALS 149, 149 (Deborah J. Salem & Andrew N. Rowan eds., 2001)
(noting that many “animal protection measures . . . have been reversed or stymied
in the face of WTO challenges or threatened challenges.”).
2. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 1, at 2 (explaining that WTO rules against
discrimination of “like products” result in a powerful disincentive to States who
want to ban the import of animal products when those animals have been reared in
inhumane conditions); see also Chris Fisher, Who’s Afraid of PPMs?, EUROPA
(May 31, 2001), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/april/tradoc_12218
7.pdf (highlighting the general reluctance to consider processes and production
methods in reforming WTO policies in response to consumer and policy makers’
concerns and that some argue that such policies might even undermine the entire
international trading system).
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animal protection, 3 the E.U. proceeded very cautiously in the years
after the WTO was formed. Wary of facing challenges before the
WTO, the E.U. held back and/or weakened several well-publicized
animal protection laws because they could potentially impact trade,
such as the ban on the import of furs caught in leghold traps, 4 the ban
on battery cages for laying hens, 5 cosmetics animal testing
regulations, 6 and labeling requirements for shelled eggs. 7
Recently, however, WTO case law suggests that countries may
have less to fear in imposing animal welfare standards on foreign
products than previously thought. Two cases—the first WTO
disputes involving animal welfare—reveal that the WTO appreciates
the growing worldwide awareness that animal welfare is an ethical
3. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty Establishing the European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306)
49 (incorporating animal welfare and protection into the E.U.’s constitutional
framework).The E.U. has also worked to promote animal welfare through several
Council Directives. See, e.g., Council Directive 2001/88/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 316/1-2)
(prohibiting extreme animal confinement systems such as certain sow stalls);
Council Directive 1999/74/EC, Laying Down Minimum Standards for the
Protection of Laying Hens, 1999 O.J. (L 203/53) (banning the barren battery cage
in the E.U. from 2012); Council Directive 2008/119/EC, Laying Down Minimum
Standards for the Protection of Calves, 2009 O.J. (L 10/7) (prohibiting the use of
crates to constrain young calves and inhibit movement). In addition, the E.U. has
worked to improve the lives of research animals. See Council Directive 2010/63,
On the Protection of Animals Used for Scientific Research, 2010 O.J. (L 276/33)
(EU) (extending legal protections to a larger range of species used for scientific
purposes and requiring application of the ‘3Rs,’ the Replacement, Reduction and
Refinement of animal use in testing).
4. This proposed ban has been largely abandoned over WTO concerns. See
Stevenson, supra note 1, at 1; see also Chris Fisher, Farm Animal Welfare and the
WTO, EUROGROUP FOR ANIMAL WELFARE (Nov. 6, 2000), http://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2005/april/tradoc_122238.pdf.
5. See Council Directive 1999/74/EC, supra note 3 (banning the use of barren
battery cages for egg production in E.U. Member States only, without affecting
eggs imported into the E.U.).
6. See Council Directive 2010/63/EU, supra note 3 (attempting to neutralize
disparities between the national implementing measures that “ensure a high level
of protection of animals used for scientific purposes” and those that “only apply
the minimum requirements laid down” in an earlier directive because these
“disparities are liable to constitute barriers to trade”); see also Stevenson, supra
note 1, at 1 (noting that this Directive, originally set to be implemented in 1998,
finally came into force in 2013 after years of delay because of WTO concerns).
7. See Council Regulation 5/2001, 2000 O.J. L 2/1 (EC) (placing mandatory
requirements for the inclusion of the production method in the marketing of shelled
eggs but providing additional generic options for imported products).

2015]

PROTECTING ANIMALS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE

435

concern and should trump free trade in certain circumstances. 8
While these disputes involve wildlife, the principles motivating the
decisions could easily be applied in other contexts, such as farm
animals and research animals.
At the same time, bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements
(“FTAs”) have begun to incorporate important provisions on wildlife
conservation and animal welfare. Historically, trade agreements have
been perceived to have purely negative outcomes for animals, and
for good reason. 9 FTAs are intended to increase the flow of goods
and services between countries, including animal products, live
animals, and other products that affect animals and/or their habitats.
Reducing or eliminating barriers to trade, such as tariffs and quotas,
enables countries with large supplies of sought-after animals and
animal products to satisfy the demands of other countries. These
demands continue to grow as the previously rare goods become
increasingly easier to obtain and further strain wild animal
populations and animals in production systems.
However, more recently, FTAs have included measures to try to
address these negative impacts that often accompany increased trade.
In certain FTAs, parties have agreed to (1) reaffirm commitments
made under important multilateral environmental agreements
(“MEAs”); (2) combat global issues that undermine legal trade, such
as wildlife trafficking and illegal, unregulated, and unreported
fishing (“IUU”); and (3) address animal welfare concerns related to
farm animal products and animal testing and research.

8. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Concerning the
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶¶ 303-06,
WT/DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012) [hereinafter US—Tuna Appellate Body Report]
(revealing that the Panel found “that the objectives of the U.S. dolphin-safe
provisions, as described by the United States and ascertained by the Panel, are
legitimate,” but that the United States’ measures were more restrictive than
necessary to achieve the objective); see also Appellate Body Reports, European
Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal
Products, ¶¶ 2.196, 5.138, WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R (May 22, 2014)
[hereinafter EC—Seal Products Appellate Body Reports] (“[T]he evidence as a
whole sufficiently demonstrates that animal welfare is an issue of ethical or moral
nature in the European Union.”) (internal quotes omitted).
9. See Stevenson, supra note 1 at 1 (describing the WTO’s free-trade rules as
“wrecking progress on animal welfare”).
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In the United States, the Dominican Republic-Central AmericaUnited States Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA-DR”) and the U.S.Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (“PTPA”) highlight the recent
positive impact of FTAs for wildlife protection. Globally, two major
trade agreements currently under negotiation, the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (“TPP”) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (“TTIP”), are also promising in terms of wildlife
protection. In both TPP and TTIP, the United States has advocated
for including strong environmental provisions present in previous
agreements, while also proposing additional species-specific
protections and new, inventive methods for combating illegal
wildlife trade. If these agreements include the robust provisions
advocated by animal protection groups, they may even address some
of the animal welfare problems embedded in industrialized animal
production as well as animal testing and research.
This article reviews the last two decades of intergovernmental
regulation of trade affecting animals. Section II provides background
on the WTO and analyzes the outcome of two recent WTO disputes
involving animals. Section III focuses on FTAs, analyzing wildlife
protection in two recent FTAs of the United States and two FTAs
currently under negotiation and discussing the potential impacts on
wildlife conservation and animal welfare. Ultimately, the article
concludes that the future looks a bit brighter for governmental and
non-governmental organizations seeking to improve worldwide
protections for wildlife seriously impacted by international trade. It
also provides some hope that the evolving worldwide consciousness
of animal welfare as a matter of ethical concern will lead to greater
protections of animals involved in international trade.

II. THE WTO AND ANIMAL WELFARE
A. BACKGROUND
The WTO was created in 1995 to regulate trade among nations,
replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”),
which had been in place since 1947. 10 The WTO aims to help trade
between countries flow as freely as possible by removing
10. What Is the WTO: Overview, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/wto_dg_stat_e.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
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unnecessary obstacles to trade and by ensuring that trade rules are
transparent and predictable. 11 Obstacles to trade arise from
discriminating against the products of one country in favor of
domestic products of another country through various arbitrary or
unjustifiable means, such as import bans, quotas, tariffs, and laws
that depart from relevant international standards. 12
However, a country can create a trade roadblock if it is
“necessary.” 13 Whether it is necessary depends on policy goals that
trump free trade concerns, such as protecting human, animal, or plant
health, and national security. 14 Essentially, the WTO attempts to
balance its goal for liberalizing trade while recognizing that certain
regulatory goals are superior, but also keeping a sharp eye out for
trade protectionism cloaked in a lofty purpose. 15
Measures restricting trade to protect animals have formed the basis
for numerous WTO challenges. 16 However, prior to the latest stage
of the US—Tuna 17 dispute, cases had focused on either species
conservation as an environmental matter or disease as a health
issue. 18 US—Tuna was the first WTO dispute to closely examine a
11. What is the WTO: Who we are, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
12. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade pmbl., Apr. 12, 1979, 1186
U.N.T.S. 276.
13. See id. ¶ 2.2 (noting that regulations cannot be more restrictive “than
necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective.”).
14. Id.
15. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 18, Oct. 30, 1947, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (“[T]o implement programs and policies of
economic development designed to raise the general standard of living of their
people [and] take protective or other measures affecting imports [certain] measures
are justified in so far as they facilitate the attainment of the objectives of [the
GATT].”).
16. WTO Rules and Environmental Policies: Introduction, WORLD TRADE
ORG. (2015), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_rules_intro_e.htm
(last visited Feb. 5, 2015) (listing the US– Gasoline case, the US–Shrimp case, the
EC–Asbestos case, and the Brazil–Retreaded Tyres case).
17. US—Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 8.
18. See Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, ¶ 171, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) (involving a dispute
about harm to sea turtles in which the United States argued that a measure banning
countries from importing shrimp into the United States—unless the shrimp were
caught by boats using turtle excluder devices—was justified as necessary to protect
an exhaustible natural resource under article XX(g) of the GATT ); see also
Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶
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measure intended to protect animals by focusing on harm to
individual members of the species as a welfare issue. Thus, how this
animal welfare measure would fare in a WTO challenge was far from
certain.

B. US—TUNA (“II”)
The US—Tuna dispute arose out of a U.S. labeling law that aimed
to curb the use of a controversial tuna fishing technique referred to as
“setting on dolphins.” 19 For reasons still unknown, a mysterious
phenomenon in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (“ETP”) exists
where schools of tuna congregate below pods of dolphins. 20 Once
fishermen discovered it in the 1950s, they routinely exploited this
relationship between dolphins and tuna. 21 Fishing boats would locate
pods of dolphins and then set weighted nets encircling the dolphins, a
practice that came to be known as “setting on dolphins.” 22 Once the
dolphins are completely enclosed in the netting, the fishermen slowly
close the circle, capturing the tuna below in the nets but also making
it difficult for the dolphins to escape. As hundreds of thousands of
dolphins were killed each year as a result of the dolphin sets, 23 many
more suffered physical injuries, psychological stress, and disrupted
breeding patterns. 24
Animal protection organizations quickly called for an end to this
cruel practice. Once the public outcry reached a fever pitch, 25 the
4, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) (acknowledging the importance of protecting
animal life and health as a general matter).
19. Id. ¶ 172.
20. The Tuna-Dolphin Issue, NOAA FISHERIES & SW. FISHERIES SCI. CTR.,
https://swfsc.noaa.gov/textblock.aspx?Division=PRD&ParentMenuId=228&id=14
08 (last modified Dec. 24, 2014).
21. See id. (estimating that approximately six million dolphins have been
killed since the fishermen began “setting on dolphins” in the 1950s).
22. Id.
23. See id. (“[The] bycatch of dolphins in the ETP tuna fishery has now been
successfully reduced by more than [ninety-nine percent]”).
24. See Earth Island Inst. v. Evans, No. C 03-0007 TEH, 2004 WL 1774221, at
*31 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2004) (noting that the dolphin population is not recovering
despite the extremely low mortality rate).
25. See generally Susan Reed, A Filmmaker Crusades to Make the Seas Safe
for Gentle Dolphins, PEOPLE MAG. (Aug. 6, 1990), http://www.people.com/people/
archive/article/0,,20118400,00.html (describing that, in the late 1980s, Sam
LaBudde, who was operating undercover on a Panamanian fishing boat, shot
footage of dolphins drowning in purse seine nets in the ETP and of the dead or
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United States—the largest market for tuna in the area—created the
“Dolphin Safe” label in 1990 to place on canned tuna sold in the
United States. 26 In doing so, it assured consumers that tuna in cans
bearing the Dolphin Safe label were not caught using specified
practices known to be harmful to dolphins like setting on dolphins.27
This effort aimed to address the harm to dolphins inherent in the
prohibited practices through market forces by making tuna caught
without harming dolphins more desirable to consumers. The U.S.
Dolphin Safe regime does not prevent the sale of tuna caught with
dolphin sets, but ensures that such tuna cannot be labeled Dolphin
Safe. 28
Because the tuna-dolphin association only exists in the ETP and
scientific research showed significant dolphin mortality rates there,
the United States focused on tuna-dolphin association in the area and
imposed stricter dolphin protection requirements vis-à-vis the
Dolphin Safe label for tuna caught there. 29 Inside the ETP, fishermen
would need an independent observer to certify that no driftnetting or
setting on dolphins had occurred and that no dolphins were seriously
injured or killed. 30 Outside of the ETP, the certification that no
dying dolphins being discarded back into the water while the fisherman kept the
tuna). After the footage of dolphins drowning aired on national television,
numerous consumer boycotts of canned-tuna emerged causing private companies
like StarKist and BumbleBee to pledge not to buy tuna caught in association with
dolphins. See, e.g., About StarKist Co., STARKIST, http://www.starkist.com/aboutstarkist (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (detailing the company’s dolphin-safe policy);
see also FAQs, BUMBLE BEE, http://www.bumblebee.com/faqs (last visited Jan.
31, 2015) (highlighting that the company’s commitment to dolphin-safe practices
dates back to 1990).
26. Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385(d)(1)
(1999) (providing for the use of a voluntary “Dolphin Safe” label if certain criteria
are met, such as prohibiting intentional setting on dolphins for tuna harvested in
the ETP).
27. See id. § 1385(a)(3) (recognizing that “consumers would like to know if
the tuna they purchase is falsely labeled as to the effect of the harvesting of the
tuna on dolphins.”).
28. See BILIANA CICIN-SAIN & ROBERT KNECHT, THE FUTURE OF U.S. OCEAN
POLICY: CHOICES FOR THE NEW CENTURY 162-63 (2000) (portraying the Dolphin
Safe regime as part of a larger effort in which the United States imposed
embargoes on tuna from various nations, such as Mexico, from 1990 to 1998).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1385(d)(1)(C).
30. See Panel Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶ 2.12, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15,
2011) [hereinafter US—Tuna Panel Report] (requiring that the statements be in
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driftnetting or setting on dolphins had occurred could be made by the
captain, and there was no requirement that dolphins not have been
seriously injured or killed. 31
Mexico, one of the countries that continues to set on dolphins to
catch tuna, formally challenged the Dolphin Safe label before the
WTO in 2008, arguing that the Dolphin Safe label violated several
provisions of both the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(“TBT Agreement”) and the GATT. 32 Specifically, Mexico
contended that the label is a de facto trade ban against Mexican tuna
because almost no U.S. consumer would buy canned tuna unless it
had the Dolphin Safe label and most Mexican-caught tuna are
ineligible for the label. Mexico argued that the Dolphin Safe label
regime is discriminatory, does not pursue a legitimate objective, and
is more trade-restrictive than necessary. 33
writing).
31. See id. ¶ 2.11.
32. In its first two decades, the Dolphin Safe label survived not only several
challenges under the GATT, including one from Mexico, but also repeated
attempts to legislatively amend it to allow setting on dolphins if no dolphins were
injured or killed. See Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, ¶ 7.3, DS21/R-39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991) (not adopted) (“The tuna labeling
provisions of the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act relating to tuna
caught in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean are not inconsistent with the
obligations of the United States under Article 1:1 of the General Agreement.”); see
also Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, 68 Fed. Reg. 2010-03, 2011 (Jan.
15, 2003) (announcing a “no significant adverse impact” finding in response to the
question of whether the intentional deployment on or encirclement of dolphins
with purse seine nets is having a significant adverse impact on any depleted
dolphin stock in the ETP); U.S. Dolphin-Safe Tuna Labeling Rule Deemed a WTO
Violation, EYES ON TRADE (May 20, 2011), http://citizen.typepad.com/eyeson
trade/2011/05/us-dolphin-safe-tuna-labeling-rule-deemed-a-wto-violation.html
(describing statement of Senator Barbara Boxer, co-author of the Dolphin Safe
label law, calling the Dolphin Safe label a victory because it provides the highest
level of protection of dolphins). But see Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 484 F.3d
1123, 1136 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting and vacating the Commerce Department’s
findings that fishery as having no significant adverse impact on dolphins); Panel
Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 6.1, DS29/R (June 16,
1994) (not adopted) (recommending that the United States bring its measures into
conformity with its GATT obligations because no contracting party had agreed to
give the right to impose trade embargoes to other parties to protect the health and
life of plants and animals). See generally Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, Construction
and Application of International Dolphin Conservation Program Act (IDCPA), 38
A.L.R. FED. 2D 295 § 1 (2009) (reviewing all U.S. litigation over the IDCPA).
33. See, e.g., US—Tuna Panel Report, supra note 30, ¶¶ 4.43, 4.50, 4.54, 4.56-
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In defense of the Dolphin Safe label, the United States relied on
the measure’s two objectives—protecting dolphins and ensuring that
consumers are not misled or deceived about whether tuna products
contain tuna that was caught in a manner that is harmful to
dolphins—to justify any alleged negative impact the measure caused
Mexico. 34 The Panel found and the Appellate Body affirmed that the
Dolphin Safe label’s objectives were legitimate and justified the
trade restrictions that the measure imposed. 35 Significantly, in
reviewing the Panel’s factual findings, the Appellate Body
determined that intentionally setting nets on dolphins is “particularly
harmful to dolphins” 36 not only because it results in observed injuries
and deaths 37 but also because it has long-term effects on reproductive
rates and breeding cycles as a result of stress. 38 Thus, the analysis
focused on how tuna fishing practices harmed individual and groups
of dolphins, not just their effects on species survival. 39
Ultimately, the Appellate Body found that the U.S. measure was
.59.
34. See id. ¶¶ 1.718, 7.748 (NOTING THAT the United States was never required
to apply Article XX of GATT to justify the measure because the Panel chose to
exercise judicial economy and not rule on Mexico’s claims under GATT); see, e.g.,
First Written Submission of the United States, United States—Measures
Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products:
Recourse to article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, ¶¶ 316-24, WT/DS381 (May 27,
2014), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/DS381.US_.Sub1_.Fin_.
Public.pdf (stating that, in the compliance proceeding, the United States turned to
Article XX(b) to justify the amended measure under GATT); see also US—Tuna
Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, ¶¶ 405-06 (declining to decide on the matter,
but determining that the Panel erred in failing to consider the GATT claims, which
meant that neither the Panel nor Appellate Body had an opportunity to consider
Article XX(b) as part of the U.S. defense).
35. See US—Tuna Panel Report, supra note 30, ¶¶ 7.424, 7.438, 7.444, 7.454
(reminding members, however, that measures must not be more restrictive than
necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective); see also US—Tuna Appellate Body
Report, supra note 8, ¶ 303 (recognizing that the U.S. dolphin-safe provisions were
legitimate “within the meaning of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement”) (emphasis
omitted).
36. See US—Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, ¶¶ 289, 297.
37. See id. ¶¶ 244-45 (citing US—Tuna Panel Report, supra note 30, ¶¶ 7.438,
7.493).
38. See id. ¶ 246 (citing US—Tuna Panel Report, supra note 30, ¶¶ 7.504,
7.737)
39. See id. ¶¶ 246-47 (explaining that the Panel determined that insufficient
evidence existed to support any findings based on the effects of dolphin species
survival outside the ETP).
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inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement because it gave
Mexican tuna fisheries less favorable treatment. 40 However, the
Appellate Body did not criticize the Dolphin Safe label because it
detrimentally impacted Mexican tuna fisheries or it imposed
differing regulatory requirements on tuna fishing inside and outside
the ETP; instead, it articulated that the Dolphin Safe label created
distinctions that improperly calibrated the different risks to dolphins
inside and outside the ETP. 41 Specifically, while the Dolphin Safe
label fully addressed the greater risk associated with intentionally
setting on dolphins inside the ETP, the Appellate Body determined
the U.S. measure ignored the lesser risks to dolphins from other tuna
fishing methods outside the ETP. 42 Thus, restricting trade to protect
animals passed muster, along with the United States’ method of
animal protection. It was the specific parameters of the measure that
were problematic.
The Appellate Body Report required the United States to take
action with respect to the Dolphin Safe label to avoid sanctions. 43
However, it did not require dismantling or scaling back the
legislation. 44 Instead the United States was able to amend the
Dolphin Safe label to strengthen the standards applying outside of
the ETP to address the risks to dolphins in the area, kept intact the
strict standards inside the ETP. 45 After the measure was amended in
July 2013, those tuna fishing outside the ETP must ensure that no
dolphins are killed or injured in sets in which the tuna is caught to
qualify for the label. 46
The US—Tuna dispute was the first to indicate that the WTO was
not as hostile to animal protection as is often thought. As an initial
40. Id. ¶ 299.
41. See id. ¶ 297.
42. See id.
43. See id. ¶ 408 (recommending “that the DSB request the United States to
bring its measure . . . into conformity with its obligations under [GATT 1994].”).
44. See id. (highlighting that the Appellate Body merely recommended that the
United States modify the measure).
45. See Dolphin-Safe Labeling Standards, 50 C.F.R. § 216.91(2)(i)-(ii) (2013)
(providing regulations for non-ETP purse seine vessels, such as requiring that no
purse seine vessels were “intentionally deployed on or used to encircle dolphins”
during the particular trip on which the tuna were caught).
46. Id.
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matter, the WTO found that the measure’s goal to protect dolphins
was legitimate and could justify restricting trade. 47 Indeed, instead of
indicating that the means of achieving that goal was impracticable,
the Appellate Body declared that the Dolphin Safe label did not do
enough to protect dolphins from harm. 48 The measure only violated
Article 2.1 of TBT because it failed to adequately address harms to
dolphins from tuna fishing outside of the ETP. 49 In doing so, the
Appellate Body also focused on dolphin welfare as opposed to
species survival. Perhaps more significantly, the WTO challenge
improved the Dolphin Safe label and provided better protections for
dolphins by widening the scope of the measure and imposing dolphin
safeguards in other oceans. 50 These new requirements may actually
further restrict trade in protecting dolphins, but are likely WTOcompliant. 51
From a broader perspective, the US—Tuna decision demonstrates
that the WTO permits countries to restrict trade to protect the welfare
of animals. 52 As a result, countries should feel confident to pass laws
to protect animals from harm even if international trade may be
negatively impacted. 53 Further, US—Tuna indicates that countries’
laws can distinguish between production methods as they relate to
animals. 54 While the production methods for tuna did not sway the
“like product” analysis, 55 the Panel found and the Appellate Body
47. US—Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, ¶¶ 341-42.
48. See id. (indicating that the United States unevenly protected dolphins
because the Dolphin Safe label was not “calibrated” to the risks of all dolphins).
49. Id.
50. See generally Enhanced Document Requirements to Support Use of the
Dolphin Safe Label on Tuna Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 40,997, 41,002 (July 9, 2013)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 216).
51. But see Dispute DS381: United States—Measures Concerning the
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WORLD TRADE
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds381_e.htm (last
visited Feb. 8, 2015) (revealing that Mexico formally challenged the U.S.
compliance measure as inadequate for the United States to fulfill its WTO
obligations, claiming that the revised label still violated WTO principles, and
noting that a compliance panel met in August 2014 to hear the case).
52. See US—Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, ¶ 341 (finding that
the dolphin-safe label at least partially fulfills its objective).
53. Id.
54. See 50 C.F.R. § 216.91(2)(i)-(ii) (providing guidelines for verifying and
labeling dolphin-safe tuna).
55. See US—Tuna Panel Report, supra note 8, ¶¶ 7.235, 7.248-.250.
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affirmed that the Dolphin Safe label’s distinction between tuna
caught by setting on dolphins and by other fishing methods—the
former being ineligible for the label and the latter being potentially
eligible—was justifiable. 56 Thus, setting up different rules for tuna
produced with varying methods did not violate any WTO principles.
This ruling came as good news to animal welfare advocates
because it gives a preliminary imprimatur to laws regulating animal
production through production methods. While US—Tuna involves
wildlife, its reasoning may be readily applied to farm animal
practices and to measures that prohibit certain practices that studies
show are more harmful to animals. As a result, addressing specific
animal production methods on a worldwide basis without violating
WTO principles may be easier.

C. EC – SEAL PRODUCTS
While US—Tuna was significant, the EC—Seal Products 57 dispute
was a watershed case in the global animal protection movement. The
dispute was pivotal not because of how it addressed the measure at
issue, but rather for the statement it makes about animal welfare’s
place in modern society and relative importance vis-à-vis free
trade. 58
The Canadian commercial seal hunt is one of the largest slaughters
of marine mammals in the world. 59 Animal protection organizations
first started sending observers to document this event in the 1950s,
and by the late 1960s, there was mounting public opposition to the
annual slaughter. 60 During that time, world markets for seal products

56. Id. ¶¶ 7.374-.378; US—Tuna Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, ¶¶
284-97.
57. EC—Seal Products Appellate Body Reports, supra note 8.
58. See id. ¶ 5.289 (deciding that, in a fact-specific analysis, the inherent
animal welfare concerns relating to the E.U. Seal Regime contribute to the
measure’s objective).
59. About the Canadian Seal Hunt, The HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE UNITED
STATES (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/seal_hunt/facts/
about_seal_hunt.html.
60. See, e.g., About IFAW, INT’L FUND FOR ANIMAL WELFARE,
http://www.ifaw.org/united-states/about-ifaw (last visited Feb. 5, 2015) (explaining
that the International Fund for Animal Welfare was founded in 1969 for the
purpose of ending the commercial hunting of harp seals in Canada).
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began to close. 61 The United States was the first country to decisively
act in 1972, banning the trade in all marine mammal products,
including seal products. 62 The E.U. prohibited the import of certain
seal products, such as newborn harp seals (whitecoats) and hooded
seal pups (bluebacks) 63 in 1983; 64 many E.U. Member States,
including Slovenia, 65 Croatia, 66 Italy, 67 Belgium, 68 the Netherlands, 69

61. About the Canadian Seal Hunt, supra note 59.
62. See Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, §§ 101,
107, 202, 86 Stat. 1027, 1029 (detailing the takings protocol for marine mammals
and specifically mentioning that fur seals must be protected as a species).
63. See Animal Welfare Aspects of the Killing and Skinning of Seals: Scientific
Opinion of the Panel on Animal Health and Welfare, EUR. FOOD SAFETY AUTH. J.,
Dec. 2007, at 1-122, available at http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/610.pdf
[hereinafter EFSA Scientific Opinion] (defining whitecoat pups as seal pups aged
twelve days or less that have not yet started to shed their white lanugo (fetal hair));
see also id. 118-122 (defining bluebacks as hooded seals that have not yet molted
their pelage (the blueback), which occurs when they are around sixteen months
old).
64. See Council Directive 83/129/EEC, 1983 O.J. (L 091) (“[C]oncerning the
importation into Member States of skins of certain seal pups and products derived
therefrom”); see also Council Directive 89/370/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 163/37)
(extending Directive 83/129/EEC indefinitely); Council Directive 85/444/EEC,
1986 O.J. (L 259/70) (amending Council Directive 83/129/EEC).
65. See Restrictions on the Import and Export of Goods, STATE PORTAL OF
THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVN., http://e-uprava.gov.si/e-uprava/en/poslovneSituacijeSt
ran.euprava?dogodek.id=344 (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) (noting that as of May 1,
2004, “the rules on import and export of goods apply in the Republic of Slovenia
as provided for by European regulations.”).
66. Press Release, Bernard Franolic, Animal Friends Croatia, Croatia Bans the
Import of Seal Pelts (Mar. 29, 2006), available at http://www.seashepherd.org/
news-and-media/2008/11/02/croatia-bans-the-import-of-seal-pelts-848.
67. See Italy Temporarily Bans Imports of Canadian Seal Products, INT’L
FUND FOR ANIMAL WELFARE (Feb. 13, 2006), http://www.ifaw.org/unitedstates/node/9656 (explaining that Adolfo d’Urso, the Italian Vice Minister for
Trade and Industrial Affairs, announced a Ministerial Decree that temporarily
banned the import of seal skins and derivatives).
68. See Request for Consultations by Canada, European Communities—
Certain Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products,
WT/DS369/1 (Oct. 1, 2007) (describing the Belgian trade ban, which “prohibits
the preparation for sale or delivery to consumers, transport for sale or delivery,
possession for the purpose of sale, importation, distribution and transfer of seal
products.”).
69. See Ending Trade in Seal Products, INT’L FUND FOR ANIMAL WELFARE,
http://www.ifaw.org/united-states/our-work/seals/ending-trade-seal-products (last
visited Feb. 9, 2015) (discussing the Netherlands “adopting national bans on the
import of seal products.”).
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Germany, 70 and Austria, 71 later considered or passed stronger
measures. Mexico and the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan followed with similar trade bans in 2006 72 and 2011, 73
respectively, bookending the E.U.’s 2009 prohibition on marketing
seal products that is the subject of the dispute. 74 Most recently,
Taiwan joined this growing list of countries in 2013 by prohibiting
trade in marine mammal products. 75
Once E.U. Member States began taking actions to limit or ban
trade in commercial seal products, the E.U. Parliament saw an
opportunity to harmonize the internal E.U. market and to address its
citizens’ concerns about commercial seal hunting. 76 Thus in 2009,
the E.U. passed a regulation that prohibited placing any seal products
from any countries (including the E.U.) on the market. 77 The
70. See German Parliament Votes Unanimously to Ban Seal Product Imports,
INT’L FUND FOR ANIMAL WELFARE (Feb. 20, 2006), http://www.ifaw.org/inter
national/node/26536 (discussing Germany’s unanimous 2006 parliamentary vote
that banned the import of seal products to send a message to the Canadian
government that Germany would not play a part in Canada’s annual seal hunt).
71. See Austria Votes to Ban Seal Products!, INT’L FUND FOR ANIMAL
WELFARE, http://www.ifaw.org/united-kingdom/node/1502 (last visited Feb. 9,
2015) (noting Austria’s recent unanimous vote to ban all seal products).
72. Mexico Bans Imports and Exports of Primates and Marine Mammals,
INT’L FUND FOR ANIMAL WELFARE (Feb. 6, 2006), http://www.ifaw.org/africa/
node/14701.
73. See Customs Alert, DELOITTE 4 (July 2011), http://bit.ly/1y6SoA1
(restricting the import of harp seal pelts in the Customs Union); see also Sheryl
Fink, Major Victory as Russia Bans Trade in Harp Seal, INT’L FUND FOR ANIMAL
WELFARE (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.ifaw.org/united-states/news/major-victoryrussia-bans-trade-harp-seal-skins.
74. See Council Regulation 1007/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 286/36) 38 (EC) (“The
placing on the market of seal products shall be allowed only where the seal
products result from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and other indigenous
communities and contribute to their subsistence. These conditions shall apply at
the time or point of import for imported products.”); see also Commission
Regulation 737/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 216/1) (EU) (providing detailed rules for the
implementation of Council Regulation 1007/2009).
75. See HSI Commends Taiwan for Historic Ban on Trade in Marine Mammal
Products, HUMANE SOC’Y INT’L (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.hsi.org/world/canada/
news/releases/2013/01/taiwan_seal_product_ban_010813.html (noting that the ban
exempts products that result from indigenous hunts).
76. See generally Council Regulation 1007/2009, supra note 74, art. 3.1
(limiting the conditions under which seal products may be put on the market).
77. See id. arts. 2(3), 3(1) (defining “placing on the market” as “introducing
into the Community market, thereby making available to third parties, in exchange
for payment” and allowing seal products to be placed on the market only when
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regulation includes exceptions for seal products resulting from
subsistence hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and other
indigenous communities (the IC exception) 78 and seal products from
hunts conducted for marine resource management purposes (the
MRM exception). 79
The prohibition was passed as a result of the E.U. Parliament’s
careful consideration of their citizens’ moral concerns about the
slaughter and scientific evidence concerning the characteristics of the
hunt. 80 Although sealing nations have repeatedly amended their seal
hunting regulations, no existing regulations can sufficiently and
consistently guarantee a humane death for seals. 81 As a result and as
it currently exists, seal hunting is inherently inhumane for three
reasons. 82
First, the hunts take place in remote, harsh environments far off
the coast, where high ocean swells, low visibility and temperatures,
and extreme weather events are common. 83 These environmental
they are a product of an indigenous hunt).
78. See id. art. 3(1).
79. See id. art. 3(2)(a)-(b).
80. See Commission Regulation 1007/2009, Trade in Seal Products, 2009 (L
286/36), ¶¶ 4-5, 11 (discussing “serious concerns by members of the public” about
“the animal welfare aspects of the killing and skinning of seals” and concluding
that it is not feasible to hunt seals in a humane way); see also Report on the
Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Concerning Trade in Seals Products, at 22 (Mar. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//NONSGML+REPO
RT+A6-2009-0118+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN (“Commercial seal hunts are
inherently inhumane because humane killing methods cannot be effectively and
consistently applied in the field environments in which they operate. Moreover,
seal hunts occur in remote locations, and are conducted by thousands of
individuals over large, inaccessible areas, making effective monitoring of seal
hunting impossible. As such only a comprehensive ban without the derogation
drafted by the Commission would meet citizens’ demands to see an end to the
trade in seal products.”); Proposed Commission Regulation 2008/0160, 2008 O.J. 2
(“The Commission received during the last years a massive number of letters and
petitions on the issue expressing citizens’ deep indignation and repulsion regarding
the trade in seal products in such conditions”); EFSA Scientific Opinion, supra
note 63, at 118 (listing general conclusions that promote the welfare of seals).
81. See id. (noting that existing regulations often are not carried out effectively
and that death of seals is not adequately monitored before skinning the animal).
82. Id.
83. See Panel Reports, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶ 7.187, WT/DS400/R, WT/DS401/R
(Nov. 25, 2013) [hereinafter EC—Seal Panel Reports].
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considerations and the decreasing amount of sea ice as a result of
climate change compound the difficulty in effectively stunning seals
in one hit, especially given that the seals are mobile on the ice. 84
Second, because of economic and safety pressures, the hunts take
place over very short periods, leading to hunters providing less care
for each kill. 85 Third, seals have unique physiological characteristics,
particularly in terms of lung capacity and responses to stress and
pain. 86
These factors lead to (1) high wounding rates, (2) unacceptable
delays between wounding, monitoring for unconsciousness, and
exsanguination, (3) high “struck and lost” rates, and (4) actions that
cause pain to wounded, conscious seals, such as live gaffing and
dragging. 87 Diminished sea ice due to climate change further
exacerbates these problems. 88 No amount of regulation can surmount
these obstacles to guarantee commercially hunted seals have a
humane death. 89
Shortly after the E.U. measure went into effect, Canada and
Norway challenged it before the WTO, arguing that it discriminated
against them and constituted an unnecessary restriction on trade in
contravention of the GATT and the TBT Agreement. 90 In defending
the measure, the E.U. took the bold step of attempting to justify it
through recourse to the public morals section, subsection (a) of
GATT Article XX. 91 Specifically, the E.U. contended that the
measure aimed to address its citizens’ public moral concerns about
the suffering involved in the commercial seal hunt and their belief
that the E.U. market should not contribute to this trade. 92 The E.U.
presented evidence demonstrating that the measure significantly
84. See id. ¶¶ 7.202, 7.204, 7.223 (noting the challenges inherent in adequately
stunning seals during hunts).
85. Id. ¶ 7.245.
86. See id. ¶¶ 7.190-.191 (explaining that seals may experience prolonged life
and more suffering than other mammals when hunted because of their greater
ability to withstand periods of poor oxygenation).
87. See id. ¶¶ 7.212-.222.
88. See id. ¶ 7.187, n.255.
89. See, e.g., id. ¶ 7.222 (“[The] circumstances and conditions of seal hunts
present specific challenges to the humane killing of seals”).
90. See, e.g., id. ¶ 7.2.
91. See, e.g., id. ¶ 7.3.
92. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 7.367, 7.625.
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contributed to these objectives by ensuring that E.U. citizens are not
confronted by these morally abhorrent products and by decreasing
demand for seal products, which has helped avoid the inhumane
killing of tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of seals since the E.U.
implemented the measure. 93
Despite Canada and Norway protesting to the contrary, the Panel
found that the E.U. measure fell within the ambit of public morals
under Article XX(a) of GATT 94 and that the protection of public
morals related to seal hunting is a legitimate objective pursuant to the
TBT Agreement. 95 The Panel acknowledged that “animal welfare is
an issue of ethical or moral nature” and that “animal welfare is
matter of ethical responsibility for human beings in general.” 96 The
explicit recognition of the importance of animal welfare by the WTO
was unprecedented.
The Appellate Body ultimately agreed with the Panel and
concluded that the current E.U. measure violated WTO principles
because it did not apply evenly to all countries. 97 Much like US—
Tuna, the Appellate Body did not condemn E.U.’s decision to restrict
trade in response to its citizens’ concerns, but instead found that how
the measure accomplished this goal was problematic. 98 Specifically,
the Appellate Body determined that the exceptions to the ban as
applied amounted to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. 99

93. Id. ¶¶ 7.434-.435.
94. See id. ¶ 7.639 (finding that the less restrictive measures proposed by the
complainants were not reasonably available to the E.U. based on its animal rights
concerns).
95. See id. ¶¶ 7.419-.420.
96. Id. ¶ 7.409
97. EC—Seal Panel Reports, supra note 83, ¶¶ 7.319, 7.352; see also EC—
Seal Products Appellate Body Reports, supra note 8, ¶¶ 5.338-.339 (finding that
the E.U. Seal Regime was applied in a discriminatory manner and was therefore
inconsistent with GATT Article XX).
98. See EC—Seal Products Appellate Body Reports, supra note 8, ¶ 5.338
(“[W]e found that the European Union did not show that the manner in which the
EU Seal Regime treats seal products derived from IC hunts as compared to seal
products derived from ‘commercial’ hunts can be reconciled with the objective of
addressing EU public moral concerns regarding seal welfare.”).
99. See id. ¶ 5.338; EC—Seal Products Panel Reports, supra note 83, ¶ 7.650
(finding that the MRM exception was not even-handed); see also EC—Seal
Products Appellate Body Reports, supra note 8, ¶¶ 1.10, 2.1-.10 (revealing that the
E.U. only appealed a select number of the Panel’s findings).
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Essentially, the Appellate Body determined that the measure did
not go far enough in achieving its objectives. 100 The Appellate Body
acknowledged the Panel’s finding that the exceptions to the
prohibition diminished the measure’s effectiveness 101 because they
allowed trade in seal products with similar animal welfare
concerns. 102 In doing so, it implicitly provided that banning trade in
seal products without exceptions would make a greater contribution
to protecting E.U. public morals as to seal welfare and be consistent
with the E.U.’s WTO obligations. 103 Although it may be politically
difficult, the door is now open for the E.U. to improve its seal
product measure by removing or scaling back the exemptions and
thus better achieve its objectives. In fact, the E.U. Commission has
put forward a proposal to amend its seal product trade ban by
removing the MRM exception and tightening up the IC exception. 104
The importance of the EC—Seal Products case cannot be
understated. If a country previously sought to protect animal welfare
by outlawing a certain practice and the trade in the products
produced using that practice, it would have to demonstrate either that
(i) the practice caused direct harm to animal life or health or the
continued survival of the species 105 or (ii) the practice caused harm to
the environment. 106 After the WTO recognized that animal welfare is
an ethical concern for all and that the protection of public moral
concerns regarding animal welfare is a legitimate objective that can
100. See EC—Seal Products Appellate Body Reports, supra note 8, ¶¶ 5.181.182 (noting that the measure did not prevent all seal products from entering the
market).
101. See EC – Seal Products (AB), paras.id. ¶¶ 5.181-, 5.182 , 5.280 (finding
that the exceptions to the E.U. measure diminish its effectiveness because
consumers’ moral concerns extend to all seal hunting, including indigenous hunts
and marine resource management hunts).
102. See id. ¶ 5.317 (indicating that the E.U. engaged in seal product trade with
Greenland, which did not have an appreciably different seal hunting industry
compared to Norway and Canada).
103. See Rob Howse, Joanna Langille & Katie Sykes, Sealing the Deal: The
WTO’s Appellate Body Report in EC- Seal Products, 18 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., no.
12, 2014 (“[V]irtually all Greenlandic seal products are eligible for [an exception
to the ban], but the vast majority of products from Canada and Norway are not”).
104. Proposed Commission Regulation Amending Regulation (EC) No.
1007/2009 on Trade in Seal Productions 2015/0028, http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/biodiversity/animal_welfare/seals/pdf/proposal.pdf.
105. See, e.g., GATT, supra note 15, Art. XX(b).
106. See, e.g., id. Art. XX(g).
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justify trade restrictions, countries have a broader basis upon which
to legislate. 107 While these disputes involve wildlife, the principles
elucidated by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body can be universally
applied to all animals in need of protection. Besides the commercial
seal hunt, the public has ethical concerns about many other animalrelated practices, such as shark finning, caging egg-laying hens, and
experimentation on chimps, that can benefit from this decision. As
the industrialization of animal agriculture continues, the moral
dimensions of extreme confinement of farmed animals and animal
transport will likely begin to concern a larger percentage of the
public. Fortunately, the notion that a nation’s ethical position on
animal welfare can justify trade restrictions will assuage the fears of
any country considering a trade-related animal welfare measure that
it will face a successful WTO challenge.
In sum, the US—Tuna and EC—Seal Products disputes provide
countries with solid footing to restrict trade to protect animals in the
future. They also give animal advocates good reason to believe that
the WTO will continue to recognize that seeking to improve animal
welfare, whether to protect animal life or health or to safeguard
public morals, is a legitimate objective that justifies restricting trade.

III. FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, WILDLIFE
CONSERVATION, AND ANIMAL WELFARE
The terms of FTAs may guide the future of international animal
welfare measures and wildlife conservation. This section seeks to
highlight how FTAs already have made substantial progress in
addressing these two areas and explain how the TPP and TTIP, two
expansive FTAs, are likely to take it further. First, it focuses on two
existing U.S. FTAs to illustrate how these agreements could
potentially make progress in wildlife conservation. From the start of
the twenty-first century, the United States has lead in negotiating the
most progressive environment chapters in several agreements. 108
107. See Adam Behsudi, WTO ‘Morals’ Decision Could Escalate Animal
Welfare Disputes, POLITICO (May 22, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/
05/wto-eu-seal-product-ban-canada-norway-107004.html (“Legal experts,
however, debate whether the decision really sets a precedent for justifying trade
restrictions based on [sic] animal welfare – either as genuine defense of public
morals or as a way to protect domestic industries.”).
108. See Scott Wilson, Comment, NAFTA’s Legacy: An Explanation of Why the
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Environment chapters traditionally concern enforcement matters
relating to national environmental laws and implementing
multilateral environmental agreements, combating the trafficking of
flora and fauna, and other issues. Second, this section focuses on the
E.U. in light of its leadership in negotiating provisions that address
farm animal welfare in the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (“SPS”)
chapters and welfare of animals in testing and research sectorspecific sections like those on chemicals, pharmaceutical, and
cosmetics.

A. THE UNITED STATES AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
1. Background
Congress grants the U.S. President the authority to negotiate FTAs
with other States. 109 Most recently, Congress granted this authority in
the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (“BTPAA”),
contained in Title XXI of the Trade Act of 2002. 110 This has been
referred to as “fast track” because the BTPAA allows for an up or
down vote on the trade agreement once the negotiating parties
finalize its terms without allowing Congress to amend those terms. 111
This authority expired in January 2009 and a new “fast track”
authority is necessary. 112

Free Trade Area of the Americas is Good for International Environmental Law, 24
TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 551, 561-62 (2005) (citing the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation as giving NAFTA “the environmental
‘teeth’ that critics demanded and President Clinton worked for during the
agreement’s negotiating process”).
109. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(d) (2002).
110. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3801(a)
(2002).
111. Id.
112. Federal Bill Extends President’s Authority to Negotiate Free Trade
Agreements, CALCHAMBER (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.calchamber.com/Head
lines/Pages/01142014-Federal-Bill-Extends-Presidents-Authority-to-NegotiateFree-Trade-Agreements.aspx; see also Vicki Needham, Hatch Says Trade
Promotion Authority a Necessity, THE HILL, (Jan. 20, 2015), http://thehill.com/
policy/finance/230028-hatch-says-trade-promotion-authority-a-necessity (citing
efforts by Senator Orrin Hatch, Senator Ron Wyden, and Congressman Paul Ryan
to pass a bipartisan trade promotion authority bill as an alternative to the 2014
proposal by Congressman Dave Camp, Senator Max Baucus, and Senator Orrin
Hatch).
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BTPAA set forth certain objectives and priorities relating to the
environment that the United States must meet in negotiating FTAs. 113
First, the United States must ensure that trade and environment
policies are mutually supportive and seek to protect and preserve the
environment and enhance international means of doing so while also
optimizing the use of the world’s resources. 114 Second, the United
States must seek provisions that require contracting parties to ensure
that they do not weaken or reduce the protections afforded in
domestic environmental laws as a means of encouraging trade. 115
Third, the United States must strengthen its trading partners’ capacity
to protect the environment through sustainable development. 116
In May 2007, the Bush Administration and a Democrats-led
Congress reached a Bipartisan Trade Deal 117 (“Bipartisan
Agreement”) coined as the new “trade policy template.” 118 It
expanded the objectives of the BTPAA relating to the environment
and provided very progressive measures that were previously never
seen in FTAs. 119 However, the objectives outlined pertained only to
the U.S. FTAs under negotiation at that time with Peru, Colombia,
Panama, and South Korea. The Bipartisan Agreement requires
commitment to seven specific MEAs, 120 subjects the environment
113. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(a)(5)
114. Id.
115. Id. § 3802(a)(7).
116. Id. § 3802(b)(11)(D).
117. See The 2007 U.S. Trade Policy Template: Opportunities and Risks for
Workers’ Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1 (June 2007), http://www.citizen.org/
documents/HRWstudyondeal.pdf.
118. See Sungjoon Cho, The Bush Administration and Democrats Reach a
Bipartisan Deal on Trade Policy, AM. SOC’Y INT’L LAW (May 31, 2007),
http://www.asil.org/print/238.
119. See id. (requiring that the parties incorporate specific MEAs); Teall
Crossen, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the Compliance Continuum,
16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 473, 499 (2004); see also JEANNE J. GRIMMETT,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41779, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE U.S.-SOUTH
KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (KORUS FTA) 10 (2012) (differentiating the
2007 FTAs from earlier FTAS by noting that the 2007 FTAs contain “additional
labor and environmental obligations, not restricting its general dispute settlement
procedures to specified provisions of its labor and environmental chapters, and not
limiting the remedy for non-compliance with an adverse panel report to the
payment of an annual monetary assessment, such. as a fine, by the defending
party”).
120. The seven MEAs include: the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES), Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances,
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chapter to dispute settlement procedures, compels non-derogation
from environmental obligations in the interest of trade and
investment, and includes specific obligations for Peru pertaining to
illegal logging and trade in violation of CITES. 121
The most important new developments in the Bipartisan
Agreement pertain to MEAs and dispute settlements. 122 Previously,
U.S. FTAs did not contain reference to specific MEAs but a general
recognition of their importance and commitment to mutual
supportiveness toward MEA objectives. 123 After 2007, the FTAs in
question also committed the parties to comply with seven specific
MEAs using binding language subject to dispute settlement. In fact
the dispute settlement provisions, formerly reserved only for
commercial chapters in FTAs, now applied to the environment
chapters of these four agreements.
2. MEAs in the Bipartisan Agreement
The first three Bipartisan Agreement objectives concern MEAs
and call for international cooperation on environmental matters
among multiple parties. 124 MEAs are transboundary in nature and
may be global, regional, or sub-regional in their scope. 125 MEAs have
Convention on Marine Pollution, Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention
(IATTC), Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, International Whaling Convention
(IWC), and Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR). Bipartisan Trade Deal, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 2-3 (May
2007), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset_upload_
file127_
11319.pdf.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See U.S.-Austl. Free Trade Agreement art. 19.8, U.S.-Austl., Jul. 1, 2005,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/australia/asset_upload_fil
e148_5168.pdf (“The Parties recognise that multilateral environmental agreements
to which they are both party play an important role, globally and domestically, in
protecting the environment and that their respective implementation of these
agreements is critical to achieving the environmental objectives of these
agreements. Accordingly, the Parties shall continue to seek means to enhance the
mutual supportiveness of multilateral environmental agreements to which they are
both party and international trade agreements to which they are both party. The
Parties shall consult regularly with respect to negotiations in the WTO regarding
multilateral environmental agreements.”).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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addressed some of the following issues: “biodiversity and nature
protection, climate change, protection of the ozone layer,
desertification, management of chemicals and waste, transboundary
water and air pollution, environmental governance (including impact
assessments, access to information and public participation),
industrial accidents, maritime and river protection, [and]
environmental liability.” 126
As required under the Bipartisan Agreement, the four FTAs
concluded with Peru, Colombia, Panama, and South Korea included
similar language about MEAs: “Each Party shall adopt, maintain,
and implement laws, regulations, and all other measures to fulfill its
obligations under the multilateral environmental agreements listed in
Annex [xx] (“covered agreements”).” 127 Inclusion of shall, as
opposed to may or should, imposes rights and obligations on each
party under these circumstances.
Further, this MEA provision and the rest of the environment
chapter in these four FTAs is subject to dispute settlement. 128 It
provides the framework for resolving disagreements that arise under
the FTAs through formal consultations that may result in monetary
payment or trade sanctions. 129 Although most MEAs already include
some type of enforcement mechanism, enforcement at the national
level may be weak or non-existent. 130 In particular, MEA parties do
not pass domestic laws that implement the MEA obligations or do
not devote necessary human and financial resources to enforce MEA
obligations. 131 Enforcement at the MEA level, which is carried out by
an internal body charged with this task, may be a lengthy and
bureaucratic process. 132 Including binding MEA provisions in FTAs

126. See Multilateral Environmental Agreements, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/international_issues/agreements_en.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
127. United States-Panama Free Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation
Act, H.R. REP. NO. 112-238, art. 17.2 (2011) (emphasis added).
128. Id. art. 17.11(7)-(8).
129. See id. arts. 17.4(1)(c), 17.4(4)(b), 17.11(7)-(8).
130. Id.
131. Kannan Ambalam, Challenges of Compliance with Multilateral
Environmental Agreements: The Case of the United Nations Convention to
Combat Desertification in Africa, 5 J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. STUD. 145, 153 (2014).
132. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-238, art. 17.4 (describing the review proceedings
that must be available to sanction or provide remedies for violations of
environmental laws).
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provide for another way to address noncompliance with MEA
obligations. At the same time, FTAs commitment to capacity
building and funding of the implementation of environment chapter
obligations, such as MEA compliance, alleviate some of the resource
concerns. 133
3. Dispute Settlement in the Bipartisan Agreement
The fifth objective of the Bilateral Agreement specifically
addresses dispute settlement and, unlike FTAs that were concluded
before this Agreement, requires the environment chapter to be
binding, subject to all remedies, procedures, and sanctions available
under other chapters of the FTA. 134 To date, only U.S. FTAs have
had binding environment chapters. 135 According to the text of the
four FTAs covered by the Bilateral Agreement, the complaining
party must first seek to address the matter under the consultations
and panel procedure provisions of the environment chapter, after
which it can seek redress through dispute settlement. 136 Dispute
settlement is limited to state-to-state resolution of complaints;
however, each of the four agreements also provide public
participation opportunities whereby the public, generally a nongovernmental organization (“NGO”), can file submissions claiming a
party has failed to comply with the environment chapter. 137
If a party loses in the state-to-state dispute settlement procedure,
they are generally “expected to remove the complained-of measure”
133. See United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Annex 18.3.4 (4),
U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006, Temp. State Dep’t No. 09-54, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text [hereinafter U.S.-Peru FTA]
(“The Parties are committed to work cooperatively to implement the actions
required under the preceding paragraph, including through capacity-building and
other joint initiatives to promote the sustainable management of Peru’s forest
resources.”).
134. See Bipartisan Trade Deal, supra note 120, at 2-3.
135. U.S. State Dep’t, Free Trade Agreements and the Environment, U.S.
EMBASSY MONTEVIDEO URUGUAY (Dec. 4, 2007), http://archives.uruguay.us
embassy.gov/usaweb/2007/07-507EN.shtml.
136. See Bipartisan Trade Deal, supra note 120, at 2-3 (agreeing that the FTA
environmental obligations will be enforced on the same basis of the commercial
provisions); see also H.R. REP. NO. 112-238, art. 17.11(6)-(7) (providing a detailed
breakdown of the dispute settlement process).
137. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-238, art. 17.6 (creating the Environmental Affairs
Council to provide a public forum for both participation and complaints).
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and remedies for non-compliance include:
[C]ompensation and the suspension of [FTA] obligations (e.g., the
imposition of a tariff surcharge on the defending Party’s products) and, as
an alternative, payment of a fine to the prevailing Party in the dispute or,
in some cases, into a fund that may be used to assist the defending Party
in complying with its obligations in the case. 138

To date, no party has reached the dispute settlement stage under
the environment chapter of any of the four agreements discussed. 139
This is the case because the United States favors other effective
means of resolving disputes including through cooperation,
diplomacy, and senior level meetings. Nonetheless, the mere
application of the dispute settlement process to the environment
chapter may motivate the parties to adhere to its terms. 140 If a party
knows that it may be subjected to dispute settlement, fines, and trade
bans, they are more likely to correct the alleged infringement without
reaching formal dispute settlement. If voluntary compliance proves
insufficient 141 the dispute settlement mechanism can be exercised.
Additionally, the public participation and consultation procedures
provide an opportunity for information-sharing on the issue in
question and thus allow for a certain level of transparency.

B. FTAS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN PRACTICE
1. CAFTA-DR and Enforcement of Sea Turtle Protection Measures
The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free
Trade Agreement (“CAFTA-DR”) includes the governments of
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the
Dominican Republic. 142 The Dominican Republic (“DR”) sea turtle
138. See GRIMMETT, supra note 119.
139. See Ambalam, supra note 131, at 154 (noting that enforcement mostly
takes place at the national level).
140. Id.
141. EIA Issues Statement Following President Humala’s Address to the
Nation, ENVTL. INVESTIGATION AGENCY (July 30, 2014), http://eia-global.org/
news-media/eia-issues-statement-following-president-humalas-address-to-thenation.
142. See CAFTA-DR SECRETARIAT FOR ENVTL. MATTERS, FACTUAL RECORD:
CAALA 07-001 SEA TURTLES DR 7 (2011) [hereinafter FACTUAL RECORD]
(describing that Humane Society International filed a submission asserting that DR
was “failing to enforce its Environmental Legislation with regard to conducting
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case under CAFTA-DR illustrates how the FTA public participation
and consultation procedures have benefited wildlife conservation.
The case concerned an allegation by Humane Society International
(“HSI”) that DR failed to effectively enforce certain domestic laws
intended to protect endangered sea turtles. 143
According to Article 17.7.1 of CAFTA-DR on Submissions on
Enforcement Matters, “any person,” 144 including NGOs, may file a
submission with the CAFTA-DR’s Independent Secretariat claiming
that one of the parties is failing to effectively enforce its
environmental laws. 145 Once certain submission requirements are
met, the Secretariat determines whether the party must submit a
response. 146 If so, once the party submits a response, the Secretariat
decides whether it must develop a factual record and notifies the
Environmental Affairs Council (“Council”) of its reasoning. 147
Regardless, the Council may also instruct the Secretariat to develop a
factual record after being notified. 148 This Factual Record can be an
effective tool to improving enforcement of environmental laws.

inventories of commercial and artisan establishments that possess or sell sea turtle
products”); CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-Central America FTA), U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/caftadr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta (last visited Jan. 30, 2015) (noting that
the CAFTA-DR “promotes stronger trade and investment ties, prosperity, and
stability throughout the region and along our Southern border.”).
143. FACTUAL RECORD, supra note 142, at 7.
144. United States-Panama Free Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation
Act, H.R. REP. NO. 112-238, art. 17.7.1 (2011).
145. Id.
146. Id. art. 17.7.4
147. Id. art. 17.5.1 (detailing that the Environmental Affairs Council consists of
“cabinet-level or equivalent representatives of the Parties, or their designees” and
each party designates “an office in its appropriate ministry that shall serve as a
contact point for carrying out the work of the Council”).
148. Id. art. 17.8.
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The timeline of the CAFTA-DR Dominican Republic Sea Turtle
Submission proceeded as follows:
Date
Action
April 4, 2007
HSI submitted a letter to the DR expressing
concern with enforcement of laws prohibiting
the killing of sea turtles and the sale of sea
turtle products.
May 9, 2007
When DR did not respond to the letter, HSI
made a Submission to the CAFTA-DR
Secretariat for Environmental Matters
(“SEM”) regarding enforcement issues.
October 1, 2007
After SEM determined the original
submission did not sufficiently address
questions of private domestic remedies sought
by HSI, HSI revised the Submission.
December 5, 2007
The SEM determined that HSI’s Submission
merited a response from the DR.
February 13, 2008
The DR, through its Secretary of State for the
Environment
and
Natural
Resources,
responded to HSI’s Submission.
August 2008
The Council, by vote from the United States,
instructed the SEM to prepare a Factual
Record.
January 2010
The SEM prepared a General Plan for
preparing a Factual Record and shared it with
Council members, the Contact Points for each
of the governments from the region, civil
society, private sector, academic institutions,
and other interested public entities.
August 31, 2010
SEM presented the Draft Factual Record to
the Council and requested that the Council
submit comments by October 15, 2010.
January 2011
Final Factual Record 149 was made publicly
available.

149. See generally FACTUAL RECORD, supra note 142.
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a. NGO Submission to the CAFTA-DR Secretariat for Environmental
Matters
On April 2007, HSI sent a letter to the DR explaining that it was
concerned about the enforcement of various domestic measures
intended to protect endangered sea turtles, but the DR did not
respond. 150 On May 9, 2007, HSI presented its Submission to the
SEM asserting that the DR failed to effectively enforce its
environmental laws, specifically General Environmental Law (Law
64-00) and Decree No. 752-01 that prohibited the killing of
endangered sea turtles and the sale of products from endangered
turtles captured and killed after July 31 of 2001. 151
Article 140 of the General Law of Environment and Natural
Resources (Law No. 64-00) states that:
[I]t is prohibited to hunt, fish, capture, mistreat, kill, traffic, import,
export, sell, manufacture or produce traditional handicrafts, as well as
exhibit and illegally possess . . . species of flora and fauna that are found
to be threatened or endangered by [DR] or any other country in
accordance with international treaties signed by [DR]. 152

Decree No. 752-01 places a ten-year ban on “the capture, killing,
collection of eggs and sale of products derived from green,
hawksbill, loggerhead and leatherback turtles.” 153 Additionally,
Article 3 of the Decree “requires that the Office of the
Undersecretary of State for Marine and Coastal Resources and the
Main Directorate of Wildlife and Biodiversity compile inventories of
products sold or used in artisan or commercial establishments that
are made from protected sea turtles.” 154
Evidence gathered by HSI and other sources, including
TRAFFIC, 155 a wildlife trade monitoring network, demonstrated that
the DR failed to complete an inventory of sea turtle products for sale
150. Id. at 22.
151. Id. at 21-22.
152. Id. at 21.
153. Id. at 21-22.
154. Id. at 22.
155. See generally ADRIAN REUTER & CRAWFORD ALLAN, TRAFFIC,
TOURISTS, TURTLES AND TRINKETS: A LOOK AT THE TRADE IN MARINE TURTLE
PRODUCTS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND COLOMBIA 3 (2006), available at
http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/tourists__turtles_and_trinkets.pdf.
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when determining which products were made before these laws came
into effect. 156 HSI argued that, without the inventory, enforcing the
domestic laws was impossible and undermined the DR’s ability to
determine if any turtle products are imported illegally, in violation of
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”). 157
b. SEM’s Factual Record on DR’s Compliance with Environmental
Legislation
In January 2011, almost four years after HSI made its initial
complaint, the SEM finalized and made public the Factual Record on
the matter. 158 According to the SEM, the Factual Record “seeks to
present factual information on the trade of sea turtles, especially the
Hawksbill Turtle (Eretmochelys imbricate), in the DR as well as on
how these species should be protected in light of the mandates
stipulated in the Dominican Environmental Legislation cited by the
Submission” and “presents technical, scientific and legal
perspectives related to the arguments presented in [HSI’s
Submission].” 159
More importantly, the Factual Record documents voluntary
measures that the DR has undertaken to address enforcement issues
of the sea turtle laws as result of the Submission procedure. For
example, in 2008, DR published the 2008-2015 Action Plan for
156. HSI’s submission was summarized by a CAFTA-DR Secretariat for
Environmental Matters determination from December 5, 2007, as follows:
The Submitter, supported by reports from a Non-Governmental Organization as well
as direct reports from contacts in the Dominican Republic, also affirms that many
ornamental products made from endangered sea turtles are sold openly in street
markets, souvenir stores, jewelry markets and stores visited by tourists throughout the
country. The Submitter asserts that the turtle shells are used to produce a wide variety
of articles such as purses, jewelry boxes, bracelets, earrings, rings, hair clips and
bands, combs, photo frames, serving plates, silverware, bowls, letter openers and
cigarette boxes as well as young, stuffed turtles. In addition, the Submitter affirms that
by not completing the inventory of products made from sea turtles, as required by
internal legislation, the Dominican Republic is not effectively enforcing its sea turtle
protection laws, which prohibit the sale of products made from endangered sea turtles
that were captured and killed in the country after July 31 of 2001.

FACTUAL RECORD, supra note 142, at 21.
157. REUTER & ALLAN, supra note 155, at 12.
158. See generally FACTUAL RECORD, supra note 142 (stating publication date
as January 2011).
159. Id. at 11.
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Compliance with the Legal Framework and the Effective Protection
(“Action Plan”) that provided that inventorying of sea turtle products
was a priority. 160 Lastly, the Factual Record documents “international
cooperation efforts” between DR, civil society, and various U.S.
government agencies that enabled DR “to carry out training, seizure,
monitoring, awareness-raising[,] and other actions.” 161
c. Advantages of Pursuing a Factual Record under FTA
Environmental Provisions
Resolving this issue through CAFTA-DR was advantageous for
HSI and civil society seeking to ensure enforcement of domestic
wildlife conservation laws through this FTA. 162 First, the DR did not
appropriately address the inventory issue prior to HSI’s submission
to the SEM. DR did not respond to HSI’s initial letter describing its
concerns about endangered turtle conservation and only responded
after the SEM Submission. 163 In addition, HSI found that “there have
not been any court actions or administrative proceedings requesting
the DR to enforce Law No. 64-00 or Decree No. 752-01 to provide
greater protections for endangered sea turtles.” 164 This indicated that
no other entity had pursued a legal domestic action on the DR’s
enforcement of sea turtle legislation and that alternative means of
redress were necessary.
Second, HSI’s case demonstrated that it may be unreasonable to
expect NGOs to fight resource-intensive legal battles domestically
that seek to address environmental problems of enormous scope. For
example, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation created by
the North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation, 165
concluded that, “it may be impractical and unrealistic for individuals
and non-governmental entities with limited resources to seek redress
160. Id. at 71.
161. Id. at 72.
162. See id. at 7 (emphasizing that such record could foster civil society
participation).
163. Id. at 22.
164. Id.
165. About the CEC, COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, http://www.cec.org/
Page.asp?PageID=1226&SiteNodeID=310&BL_ExpandID=878 (last visited Feb.
6, 2015) (providing that the North American Agreement for Environmental
Cooperation mechanism was created by Canada, Mexico, and the United States as
part of NAFTA).
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through private remedies for a transnational problem of great scope
and complexity.” 166 Domestic private remedies can be very costly to
pursue and redress available under domestic law often falls short or
is simply inappropriate. Thus, HSI argued that, “CAFTA-DR
provides the most favorable opportunity to draw attention to the
failure of the [DR] to effectively enforce its sea turtle protection
laws.” 167 In fact, both the DR’s Action Plan and various cooperation
efforts that resulted from the Submission support this claim. 168
Third, although HSI was limited to non-binding remedies under
CAFTA-DR in the form of the Factual Record in this case, the
Factual Record offered multiple benefits. The SEM developed a
detailed report on the technical, scientific, and legal issues related to
DR’s sea turtle population and its inventory of sea turtle products for
sale; this spared the DR the cost of compiling this data itself. 169
Additionally, developing the Factual Record gave DR the political
capital to develop its 2008-2015 Action Plan and engage with
various entities on capacity building to improve enforcement of its
environmental legislation. 170 It must be noted, however, that a
Factual Record is meaningless if it is not developed within a
reasonable timeline, especially when dealing with endangered
species where time is of the essence. In the sea turtle case, it took
almost four years to complete the Factual Record. 171 Generally, a
one-year timeline is considered more reasonable and effective.
2. CAFTA-DR and Additional Benefits for Wildlife and Conservation
a. Environmental Trade Capacity Building under CAFTA-DR
Apart from providing a process to address insufficient
enforcement of environmental laws, CAFTA-DR also includes
provisions on trade capacity building, another powerful tool to
improve enforcement and benefit wildlife conservation. 172 The
166. FACTUAL RECORD, supra note 142, at 23 (internal quotes omitted).
167. Id. at 22.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 7-8.
170. Id. at 32.
171. Id. at 21.
172. U.S.-CAFTA-DR Environmental Cooperation Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE pmbl. (Feb. 1, 2005), http://www.state.gov/e/oes/eqt/trade/caftacooperation/
142688.htm.
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CAFTA-DR Environmental Cooperation Agreement (“ECA”) calls
on the parties “to cooperate to protect, improve and conserve the
environment, including natural resources” and seeks “to establish a
framework for such cooperation among the Parties.” 173 In Article V
of the ECA entitled Work Program and Priority Cooperation Areas,
it also states:
The work program developed by the Commission shall reflect national
priorities for cooperative activities and shall be agreed upon by the
Parties. The work program may include long-, medium-, and short-term
activities related to: . . . (c) fostering partnerships to address current or
emerging conservation and management issues, including personnel
training and capacity building. 174

In the United States, implementing these provisions and the
CAFTA-DR environment chapter as a whole requires cooperation
between the U.S. Trade Representative’s (“USTR”) office, the U.S.
Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International
Development. Other agencies may also be involved depending on the
agreement, such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The FTA
parties prepare a work plan for environmental trade capacity building
and environmental cooperation that becomes the guide for on-theground work. Programs are typically implemented by a hybrid of
government personnel and the public and private sector. These
programs are critical to FTA’s success and require specific funding
allocation that the U.S. Congress must appropriate for this
purpose. 175
b. Examples of Effective Trade Capacity Building under CAFTA-DR
In terms of public sector participation, civil society may impact
wildlife conservation efforts through trade capacity building in
multiple ways. For example, HSI has been involved in CAFTA-DR
capacity building efforts since 2005. Funded by the U.S. State
Department, HSI’s Latin America office has executed a variety of
programs throughout the CAFTA-DR region. It has carried out
173. Id. art. II (“The Parties recognize the importance of both bilateral and
regional cooperation to achieve this objective.”).
174. Id. art. v(1)(c) (emphasis added).
175. State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill of
2015, H.R. REP. NO. 113-113, at 35 (2014).
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trainings for CITES enforcement personnel. 176 HSI also completed
public outreach against wildlife trafficking, including billboards and
radio advertisements. It conducted a Central American Rescue
Center Sustainability Study, assessing the status of each wildlife
rescue center intended to handle confiscated and otherwise rescued
animals. 177 Using this knowledge, HSI later helped a variety of
centers to standardize their protocols, such as those related to
biosafety and emergency care, and improve infrastructure, such as
building some centers from the ground up. 178 Finally, HSI also
developed and ran an animal handling workshop for border patrol,
police, and customs officials. 179 These efforts would not be possible
without the capacity building provisions found in the CAFTA-DR
ECA and without U.S. Congress allocating the funding for this
effort.
3. U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement
CAFTA-DR laid the groundwork for even stronger environmental
obligations in FTAs that followed. As previously mentioned, trade
deals concluded at the time of the Bipartisan Agreement—with the
countries of Peru, Colombia, Panama and South Korea—were
required to incorporate a variety of new provisions not present in
CAFTA-DR. These include a specific list of MEAs, non-derogation
176. CITES Law Enforcement Training: Guatemala & El Salvador, CAFTADR ENVTL. COOP., http://www.caftadr-environment.org/top_menu/countries/
Regional/B_re_activitiy_snapshot_CITES_Law-Enforcement_Training.html (last
visited Feb. 9, 2015).
177. Marta M. Prado, Combating Illegal Wildlife Trafficking in Central
America, HUMANE SOC’Y INT’L (Sept. 24, 2009), http://csis.org/files/attachments/
090924_prado_presentation.pdf.
178. See Costa Rica to Shut Down its Zoos—But It’s not Going to be Easy,
TAKEPART, http://www.takepart.com/article/2013/08/07/costa-rica-zoo-shutdown
(last visited Apr. 8, 2015) (discussing the efforts of HSI Latin America to improve
the infrastructure and protocol of rescue centers as the population of rescue center
in the aftermath of Costa Rica closing two of its zoos); Supporting Wildlife Rescue
Centers CAFTA-DR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/121781.pdf (last visited on Apr. 8, 2015) (listing some of
HSI’s efforts: “[c]ollaborating with the CAFTA-DR governments and local NGO
partners to develop strategies for rescue center sustainability” and “training rescue
center staff and volunteers on the provisions of [CITES]”).
179. Mike Skuja, Wildlife Hotspots: Animal Handling Along the Guatemalan
Border, HUMANE SOC’Y INT’L (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.hsi.org/news/news/
2011/02/wildlife_hotspots_021711.html.
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obligation for environmental laws, and binding dispute settlement for
environmental obligations that include sanctions. 180 The PTPA,
which came into force on February 1, 2009, 181 was also unique in
that in addition to the Bipartisan Agreement provisions, it included
“special provisions committing Parties to biodiversity conservation,
including non-consumptive use, and a forest governance annex that
recognizes the link between illegal logging and illegal wildlife
trade.” 182
a. Biodiversity Conservation and Non-Consumptive Use
Article 18.11 of the PTPA addresses matters of biological
diversity. 183 The article states that “the Parties remain committed to
promoting and encouraging the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity and all its components and levels, including
plants, animals, and habitat.” 184 It provides, in part, that “[t]he Parties
also recognize the importance of public participation and
consultations, as provided by domestic law, on matters concerning
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.” 185 The
parties must also commit to cooperate on these matters, such as
through the ECA. 186
Commonly FTA references to promotion of “sustainable use” of
biological diversity imply “consumptive use,” and with respect to
wildlife this generally means the animal is killed “as in hunting,
fishing and trapping.” 187 However, PTPA made an important step to
180. Bipartisan Trade Deal, supra note 120, at 2-3.
181. United States – Peru Trade Promotion Agreement: Strengthening Forest
Sector Governance in Peru, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/2013-Progress-under-the-Forest-Annex.pdf (last visited Feb. 9,
2015) [hereinafter USTR Forest Annex].
182. Patricia Forkan, International Trade: One Way Forward for Humans,
Animals, and the Environment, in OPPORTUNITIES AND OBLIGATIONS: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL AND U.S. TRADE 323 (2009).
183. U.S.-Peru FTA art. 18, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006, Temp. State Dep’t No.
09-54, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text.
184. Id. art. 18.11(2).
185. Id. art. 18.11(4).
186. Id. art. 18.11(5).
187. Pro and Con: Consumptive and Nonconsumptive Uses of Wildlife,
COUNCIL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION, http://www.fws.gov/uploadedFiles/
Region_1/NWRS/Zone_2/Inland_Northwest_Complex/Turnbull/Documents/
EE/Endangered_Species/Pro%20and%20Con%20Consumptive%20and%20Nonco
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offer greater protection for wildlife by defining sustainable use as
“non-consumptive or consumptive use in a sustainable manner.” 188
Non-consumptive use implies any non-hunting or non-extractive use
of wildlife that may include wildlife photography, bird watching, and
whale watching, among others.
The U.S.-Peru Environmental Cooperation 2011-2014 Work
Program (“Work Program”), executed by the Environmental
Cooperation Commission (“ECC”) established under Article III of
the U.S.-Peru ECA 189 specifically cites to this article and states that
one of the joint cooperation goals is to “[p]rovide assistance to
strengthen trade consistent with PTPA Article 18.11.” 190
b. Forest Sector Governance Annex
The Environment Chapter of the PTPA includes what some have
described as a “groundbreaking” 191 Annex on Forest Sector
Governance (“Forest Annex”). Although it focuses primarily on
illegal logging, the Forrest Annex also calls on the parties to combat
illegal wildlife trade and to protect CITES-listed species. These
commitments have resulted in several important changes to Peru’s
wildlife laws and ways it implements CITES.
PTPA provides, in relevant part, that each Party must “combat
trade associated with . . . illegal trade in wildlife.” 192 It also explicitly
acknowledges that illegal trade in wildlife “undermine[s] trade in
products from legally harvested sources, reduce[s] the economic
value of natural resources, and weaken[s] efforts to promote
conservation and sustainable management of resources.” 193 To assist
in implementing these provisions of the Forest Annex, Peru enacted
the Forestry and Wildlife Law 194 along with draft implementing
nsumptive%20Uses%20of%20Wildlife.pdf (last visited on Apr. 8, 2015).
188. Id. art. 18.11(1) (emphasis added).
189. Peru Environment Cooperation Agreement art. 3, July 26, 2006,
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Peru%20Environmental%20Cooperation%2
0Agreement.pdf.
190. United States-Peru Environmental Cooperation 2011-2014 Work
Program, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/169
165.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
191. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 183, Introduction.
192. Id. ANNEX 18.3.4(1).
193. Id.
194. Ley Forestal y de Fauna Silvestre [Forestry and Wildlife Law], Ley No.

468

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[30:3

regulations. 195 The new law was an important outcome of the PTPA
and reflected progress on many key issues, but it also raised some
concerns among wildlife groups.
First, the law recognized the value of wildlife for human beings
and the ecosystem. 196 Second, to manage wildlife effectively, it
required that each party implement a number of plans, such as
construction of necessary facilities, conservation plans for
reintroduction and repopulation, population evaluations, and
threatened species lists. 197 Third, it provided for wildlife conservation
centers, which include public or private facilities for captive wildlife
for their protection, conservation, rehabilitation, repopulation, or
reintroduction back into the wild. 198 Finally, the law designated the
National Forest and Wildlife Service (“SERFOR”) 199 as the body
responsible for forest and wildlife national policy, including wildlife
conservation centers. 200 This is critical because CITES requires that
the CITES Management Authority entity manage rescue centers 201
and SERFOR is within Peru’s CITES Managing Authority.
Some wildlife NGOs have expressed concerns with the law. The
law emphasizes “sustainable use” of wildlife resources, as opposed
to non-consumptive use. 202 Its definition of “wildlife” 203 excludes
29763 (2011) (Peru) (recognizing the importance of wildlife and that its protection
requires productive and participatory conservation oriented at sustainable
maintenance).
195. USTR Forest Annex, supra note 181, at 2.
196. Forestry and Wildlife Law, Ley No. 29763, art. 85 (Peru) (prohibiting the
use of wildlife resources without obtaining authorization).
197. Id. art. 86.
198. Id. art. 96.
199. SERVICIO NACIONAL FORESTAL Y DE FAUNA SILVESTRE [NAT’L FOREST &
WILDLIFE SERV.], http://dgffs.minag.gob.pe (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
200. Ley Forestal y de Fauna Silvestre, Ley No. 29763 (2011) (Peru) (creating
the National Forest and Wildlife Service as the specialized technical body with a
legal personality under public law which is responsible for enacting regulations
and establishing the necessary procedures for forest and wildlife issues).
201. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora art. VIII (4)(b), Mar. 3, 1973, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243
[hereinafter CITES].
202. Forestry and Wildlife Law, Ley No. 29763 (Peru) (establishing sustainable
use of forest and wildlife as a primary objective of the law).
203. Id. art. 6 (defining wildlife as “non-domesticated species, native or exotic,
including their genetic diversity, which live freely in the national territory, as well
as domestic species, which due to abandonment and other causes, have assimilated
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certain non-amphibious and aquatic amphibious species. 204
Additionally, according to the law, SERFOR manages wildlife
conservation centers, but regional authorities manage rescue centers.
This contradicts the requirement of CITES Article VIII(5) that a
“Management Authority,” in this case SERFOR rather than regional
authorities, must oversee rescue centers. 205 Finally, the law’s
proposed implementing regulations include language regarding
placement of confiscated wildlife with breeding centers that focus on
breeding animals as opposed to rehabilitation and long-term care in
the case of rescue centers. 206
Another important wildlife-related provision of the Forest Annex
commits parties to “work within the framework of CITES to protect
CITES-listed species” and to act in a manner that is consistent with
its CITES obligations. 207 CITES is one of the most critical wildlife
MEAs, and including this provision in the PTPA encouraged several
positive developments in Peru. For example, to meet these
obligations, Peru assigned the Ministry of Environment as the CITES
Scientific Authority and the Ministry of Agriculture as the CITES
Management Authority. 208 Peru also received Category I status based
on the CITES National Legislation Project, which denotes that Peru’s
CITES implementing legislation largely satisfies CITES
requirements. 209 Moreover, the PTPA Work Program included
several ECC objectives pertaining to CITES, such as “a training plan
for CITES authorities” 210and “[t]echnical support” 211 for MEAs.

into the wildlife, excluding amphibious species which are born in marine and
inland water, which are governed by their own laws. The scope of the law also
includes wildlife species, whether alive or dead along with eggs and any parts or
derivatives thereof, that are held in captivity”).
204. Id.
205. CITES, supra note 201, art. VIII (5).
206. Humane Society International comments on Forestry and Wild Fauna Law
N° 29763 submitted to Peru’s Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) (Feb. 28, 2014)
Mara Burr, U.S. Trade Representative, and Ernesto Guevara (Apr. 2010).
207. Id. ¶ 15 (“[N]othing in this Annex shall limit the authority of either Party
to take action consistent with its legislation implementing CITES.”).
208. USTR Forest Annex, supra note 181, at 1.
209. Id.
210. United States-Peru Environmental Cooperation 2011-2014 Work
Program, supra note 190, at 5 (describing Activity 1.7 of Theme 1).
211. Id. at 6 (quoting Activity 2.3 in Theme 2).
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c. U.S.-Peru Environmental Cooperation 2011-2014 Work Program
To guide the progress on PTPA environmental cooperation, the
ECC, established under Article III of the ECA, devised multiple
work programs for the years 2009-2010 and 2011-2014. 212 The Work
Program included themes and objectives to achieve long-term goals
that include effectively implementing the PTPA Environment
Chapter, improving the protection and conservation of the
environment, increasing transparency and public participation, and
promoting a culture of environmental protection and compliance
with environmental laws. 213 The ECC regularly reports on the
progress of parties in achieving these objectives. 214
d. Criticism of PTPA Enforcement
Without effectively enforcing these provisions, even the most
protective FTA is insufficient. The PTPA has made substantial
progress in advancing environmental and wildlife conservation, but
recent accounts suggest that Peru is facing issues with enforcing the
environmental obligations. For example, in 2014, the Environmental
Investigation Agency reported that Peru’s new law, Law 30230,
included “measures that roll back environmental standards in a
misguided effort to attract greater investment in Peru.” 215 Peru’s law
is alleged to contradict Article 18.3 of PTPA, which prohibits parties
from waiving or derogating from protections afforded in domestic
environmental laws to encourage trade or investment. 216 If FTA
parties do not comply with the terms of the agreement, they must
face consequences or the terms are meaningless. If the allegations
prove true, the United States’s response under the terms of PTPA
could set an important precedent for FTA environment chapters.

212. United States-Peru Environmental Cooperation 2011-2014 Work
Program, supra note 190.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. EIA Issues Statement Following President Humala’s Address to the
Nation, supra note 141.
216. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 183, art. 18.3(2) (“The Parties recognize that it
is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by weakening or reducing the
protections afforded in their respective environmental laws.”).
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4. Trans-Pacific Partnership and Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership Agreements
Having discussed CAFTA-DR and PTPA and the ways in which
they benefit wildlife conservation, this sub-section examines two of
the most recent and far-reaching FTAs that aim to go even further in
achieving environmental and animal welfare. The first is the TPP,
negotiations for which began in 2004 and are nearing completion as
of 2015. 217 TPP “is the first major twenty-first-century trade
negotiation encompassing not only tariffs and quotas but also new
areas like regulatory cooperation, competition policy, environment
and labor, and trade in digital goods and services.” 218 There are
currently twelve TPP countries from along the Pacific Ocean and
“represent [forty] percent of global GDP, [twenty-six] percent of
global trade, and [forty] percent of U.S. trade.” 219 The second is the
TTIP, which the United States and twenty-eight E.U. Member States
has been negotiating since 2013 and is ongoing as of 2015. The
United States and the E.U. account “for nearly [thirty] percent of
global merchandise trade, about [forty] percent of world trade in
services, and nearly half of global GDP.” 220 TTIP aims to remove
non-tariff barriers and enhance regulatory cooperation in the
environment and labor, among other areas. Considering that the text
of both agreements will only be publicly available after the
negotiations are officially complete, this section discusses whether
the TPP and TTIP may include environment and animal welfare
provisions that go far beyond previous FTAs.

217. Peter S. Rashish, Bridging the Pacific: The Americas’ New Economic
Frontier?, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 1 (July 2014), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
images/files/Bridging_the_Pacific_report.pdf.
218. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
219. Id. at 3.
220. What You Need to Know About TTIP, EUROPEAN AM. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, http://www.eaccny.com/international-business-resources/what-you
need-to-know-about-ttip/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
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a. Trans-Pacific Partnership
i. TPP Background
As of 2015, negotiating parties to TPP include Australia, Brunei,
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States. 221 Other countries, such
as China, South Korea, and Thailand, have sought to join
negotiations. 222 Because the TPP is a “docking agreement,” other
parties are able to join the negotiations. 223 These countries cover an
area of not only great economic importance, but also environmental
significance. For example, TPP countries cover areas such as
Australia’s Great Barrier Reef, which is “the world’s largest coral
reef system” and “home to more than 11,000 species” and Peru’s
Amazon Rainforest, which is “one of the most biologically diverse
areas on Earth.” 224
Unfortunately, the natural environment and rich biodiversity of the
Pacific Rim are vulnerable to both illegal and unsustainable
commercial exploitation and other threats. 225 The Asia-Pacific region
alone is home to roughly one third of the world’s threatened
species. 226 TPP parties are either source or demand countries for
illegally trafficked wildlife, many of which are endangered or likely
to become endangered, and often “do not have sufficient rules or fail
to adequately enforce their laws against the trade.” 227 TPP countries
also “make up more than one third of the global fisheries catch, and
more than one tenth of the world aquaculture production.” 228 Given
this vulnerability and the importance of conservation efforts in the
221. Rashish, supra note 217, at 3.
222. David Pilling & Shawn Donnan, Trans-Pacific Partnership: Ocean’s
Twelve, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8c253c5c2056-11e3-b8c6-00144feab7de.html#axzz3QKcYXf5j.
223. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: What It Could Mean for the
Environment, SIERRA CLUB, http://action.sierraclub.org/site/DocServer/TPP_Fact
_Sheet_Final4-Leave_Behind.pdf?docID=14001 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Letter from Members of Congress to Michael Froman, Ambassador, U.S.
Trade Representative (Feb. 20, 2014), available at http://blumenauer.house.gov/
images/stories/2014/02-20-14%20Blumenauer-DeFazio-Levin%20TPP%20
Environment%20Letter%20-%20Final.pdf.
228. Id.
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regions covered by the TPP, the negotiating parties and civil society
agree that the TPP must serve to bolster environmental protection
and support biodiversity without encouraging environmental
deregulation in the interest of trade.
ii. TPP Environment Chapter
The United States has articulated that the TPP has the potential to
positively impact the environment and has played a significant role
in leading the discussion of this issue. In its Interim Environmental
Review, the USTR articulated that the TPP could “reinforc[e] efforts
to effectively enforce environmental laws and enhance the
conservation of natural resources, accelerat[e] economic growth and
development through trade and investment which could make
environmental protection a higher priority, and disseminat[e]
environmentally beneficial technologies and services.” 229 In addition,
it “provides a context for enhancing bilateral and regional
cooperation activities to address environmental issues of concern.” 230
The USTR also published a Green Paper on conservation and the
TPP in December 2011 231 that outlined U.S. objectives for the
environment chapter, focusing on non-marine wildlife species,
marine and oceans governance, and illegal logging and associated
trade. 232 This proposed framework includes an obligation to: (1)
maintain laws and regulations that bar trade in illegally harvested
products, including wildlife, across TPP borders and (2) emphasize
information sharing among law enforcement personnel, provisions
that provide for mechanisms to ensure cooperation between TPP
regulatory and law enforcement entities, and enhanced collaboration

229. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, INTERIM ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW: TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT ii (2013), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/TPP%20Interim%20Review%20-%20final%20for%20posting
%20-%208.22.13.pdf; OFFICE OF THE US TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, INTERIM
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW: TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (AUG 2013),
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP%20Interim%20Review%20-%20final
%20for%20posting%20-%208.22.13.pdf.
230. Id.
231. USTR Green Paper on Conservation and the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 6, 2011), available at http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/
st/english/texttrans/2011/12/20111206135136su0.133343.html?distid=ucs#axzz3Q
Kv5z6pS.
232. Id.
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with NGOs, private sector, scientists, and local communities to
address illegal trade. 233 With respect to wildlife, the Green Paper
calls for the full implementation of CITES and, as for marine
fisheries, it calls for strong measures on subsidies and Illegal,
Unregulated, and Unreported (“IUU”) fishing. 234 Finally, the United
States has stood firm in asserting that the environment chapter must
be fully enforceable through a dispute settlement mechanism. 235
For the majority of the TPP countries, their previous FTAs did not
include an environment chapter and the environment goals advanced
by the United States represented an ambitious leap forward. A draft
of the environment chapter was leaked in January 2014. 236 Although
the document is now outdated, it provides important insights into the
negotiations and reveals that at one point in the negotiations the TPP
parties did not fully support the United States’ proposed
provisions. 237 For example, all parties opposed the language
requiring them to “adopt, maintain, and implement” measures to
fulfill specific MEAs, including CITES, most likely because the
parties felt they could not fully comply with this obligation and
feared the consequences of failing to comply with the chapter. 238
Moreover, the parties could not agree to the application of the
enforceable dispute settlement procedures, such as trade sanctions, to
the environment chapter. 239 Four of the twelve countries did not
support the draft provision concerning conservation measures for

233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Letter from Members of Congress to Michael Froman, supra note 227.
236. Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) - Environment
Consolidated Text, WIKILEAKS (Jan. 15, 2014), https://wikileaks.org/tpp-enviro/.
237. The leaked document is dated November 24, 2013. Id.
238. Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) – Environment Chair
Report, WIKILEAKS (Jan. 15, 2014), https://wikileaks.org/tpp2/static/pdf/tpp-treatyenvironment-chapter.pdf (noting that the MEAs include CITES, Montreal Protocol
and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships).
239. Id. at SS.12.
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sharks, marine turtles, seabirds, and marine mammals. 240 Nine
countries could not agree with the draft language that required TPP
parties to take measures to prohibit trade in wild flora and fauna
taken or traded in contravention of a foreign law. 241 Of course only
the final text will reveal what the parties ultimately agreed to include
in TPP.
The leak also gave important insight into the chapter’s language,
which several environmental and wildlife groups found to be
substantially lacking because the Bipartisan Agreement list of MEAs
was not included, the dispute settlement provision did not allow for
sanctions, and the leak appeared to permit continued subsidies for
fishing vessels and other activities that deplete fishing stocks, among
other setbacks. 242 The United States responded that it would continue
to push for robust provisions 243 and, if successful, TPP could provide
240. Malaysia, New Zealand, Australia, and Japan did not agree to the
following text as it was drafted:
The Parties acknowledge their role as major consumers, producers and traders of
fisheries products and the importance of the marine fisheries sector to their
development and to the livelihoods of their fishing communities, including artisanal or
small-scale fisheries. The Parties also acknowledge that the fate of marine capture
fisheries is an urgent resource problem facing the international community.
Accordingly, the Parties recognize the importance of taking measures aimed at the
conservation and the sustainable management of fisheries.

Id. at SS.16.
241. Id. at SS.17. Australia, Brunei, Chile, Japan, Mexico, Malaysia, Peru,
Singapore, and Vietnam could not agree to the text as drafted.
242. Press Release, Natural Res. Def. Council, Green Groups: Leaked TransPacific Partnership Environment Chapter Unacceptable (Jan. 15, 2014), available
at http://www.nrdc.org/media/2014/140115.asp; see also Analysis of Leaked
Environment Chapter Consolidated Text, SIERRA CLUB (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://action.sierraclub.org/site/DocServer/TPP_Enviro_Analysis.pdf?docID=1482.
243. Michael Froman, Remarks at the U.S. Department of State ‘Our Ocean’
Conference (June 17, 2014), available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2014/June/Remarks-by-USTR-Froman-atDepartment-of-State-Our-Ocean-Conference (“[W]e’ve seen TPP as a potential
model for other trade agreements to take on environmental sustainability issues,
particularly illegal logging, illegal wildlife trade and illegal fishing.”). Michael
Froman also stated that:
[The United States is] seeking, in TPP, ground-breaking commitments to protect our
oceans – commitments never seen before in a trade agreement. We’re working to
advance sustainable fisheries management, including management systems that are
based on internationally recognized best practices and the best scientific information
available and to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, or ‘pirate
fishing.’

Id.
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an avenue for strong environmental and wildlife conservation
protections. CAFTA-DR and PTPA have demonstrated the value of
environment chapters in trade agreements, and TPP stands to push
the envelope even further if the parties include strong enforceable
provisions.
iii. TPP SPS Chapter and Animal Welfare
TPP is most likely to increase trade, or at a minimum increase
trade opportunities, in agricultural products like meat, eggs, and
milk, because it reduces or eliminates tariffs and other trade barriers.
The SPS chapter in FTAs addresses issues that might arise in the
trade of these products, specifically concerning food safety or
diseases, which are carried by plants or animals. 244 There has been no
indication from any of the TPP parties that animal welfare issues –
such as housing, transport, and slaughter - will be covered under the
SPS chapter or any other section of the agreement. This is
concerning because as trade in agricultural products increases, there
is an increased potential for harmful U.S. industry practices, such as
routine tail docking and extreme confinement systems for breeding
sows, laying hens, and veal calves that are exported to the AsiaPacific region. However, as will be discussed below, the U.S.-E.U.
trade deal currently under negotiation has an opportunity to include
animal welfare provisions and set a standard for future FTAs to
follow.
b. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
i. TTIP Background
The TTIP parties describe TTIP as “an ambitious and
comprehensive trade agreement that significantly expands trade and
investment between the United States and the E.U., increases
economic growth, jobs, and international competitiveness, and

244. Introduction to the SPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/sps_agreement_cbt_e/c1s4p1_e.htm
(last visited Feb. 5, 2015) (requiring animals and animal products to come from
disease-free areas, compelling inspections for microbiological contaminants,
mandating a specific fumigation treatment for products, and setting maximum
allowable levels of pesticide residues in food).
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addresses global issues of common concern.” 245 Apart from
eliminating tariffs and other duties and charges, TTIP also aims to
eliminate or reduce non-tariff barriers to trade and unnecessary
regulatory differences, such as differences in technical regulations,
standards, and approval procedures. 246 With respect to animals, the
TTIP could have a very broad impact on animal protection,
especially in the wildlife provisions in the environment chapter,
animal welfare in chapters relevant to agriculture, and welfare for
animals used in research and testing in the sector-specific sections
concerning chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and cosmetics. However,
two areas of TTIP referred to as regulatory coherence and InvestorState-Dispute-Settlement (“ISDS”) may present barriers to advances
in wildlife protection and animal welfare.
ii. TTIP Environment Chapter
If TTIP’s environment chapter includes the highest standards in its
provisions and allocates the necessary resources to implement the
chapter, it will demonstrate United States and E.U. global leadership
on wildlife protection and conservation. The United States
articulated its goal for the environment chapter by providing that it
“seek[s] to obtain . . . appropriate commitments by the E.U. to
protect the environment, including conserving natural resources, and
to effectively enforce environmental laws, and seek opportunities to
address environmental issues of mutual interest.” 247 The E.U.
asserted that the chapter’s overarching goal must be “to ensure that
trade and economic activity can expand without undermining the
pursuit of social, and environmental policies.” 248 First, both the
United States and the E.U. have placed increased political emphasis

245. U.S. Objectives, U.S. Benefits In the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership: A Detailed View, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (March X, 2014),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2014/March/
US-Objectives-US-Benefits-In-the-TTIP-a-Detailed-View [hereinafter USTR
TTIP Detailed View].
246. Id.; see also About TTIP, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/infocus/ttip/about-ttip/ (last updated Jan. 22, 2015).
247. USTR TTIP Detailed View, supra note 245.
248. Trade and Sustainable Development: Initial EU Position Paper, EUROPA
2, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151626.pdf (last visited
Feb. 6, 2015).
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on combating wildlife trafficking. 249 Illegal wildlife trade threatens
the survival of many species and, because it can be lucrative, is often
linked to global security threats as criminal syndicates become
involved. Moreover, illegal wildlife trade including timber and fish is
estimated to be worth nineteen billion dollars or more per year, 250
ranking it among other top criminal activities including trafficking in
narcotics, weapons, and human beings. Consequently, protecting
wildlife from illegal trade should be a key priority for E.U.
negotiators and the TTIP’s environment chapter must articulate the
commitment of both parties to combat wildlife trafficking.
Second, TTIP must include strong conservation and management
provisions to ensure marine species conservation and the survival of
marine turtles, sharks, and marine mammals, such as whales and
polar bears, through adequate conservation and management
measures. All species of marine turtles are classified as endangered
because of poaching, over-exploitation, habitat destruction, and
climate change. According to a study by the International Union for
the Conservation of Nature, twenty-five percent of sharks and rays
249. On February 2014, the United States finalized its National Strategy for
Combating Wildlife Trafficking, drafted with the help of an Advisory Council
featuring representatives from the private sector, non-profit sector, conservation
sphere, academia, law enforcement, and the legal field. Advisory Council on
Wildlife Trafficking Members, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SER., http://www.fws.gov/
international/advisory-council-wildlife-trafficking/bios.html (last visited Apr. 8,
2015).U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, International Affairs, Federal Advisory
Council on Wildlife Trafficking, Web. 9 April 2014, http://www.fws.gov/
international/advisory-council-wildlife-trafficking/bios.html. Together they
devised a national strategy focusing on three priorities: (1) strengthen enforcement;
(2) reduce demand for illegally traded wildlife; and (3) expand international
cooperation and commitment. National Strategy for Combating Wildlife
Trafficking, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/de
fault/files/docs/nationalstrategywildlifetrafficking.pdf.S. National Strategy for
Combatting Wildlife Trafficking, February 2014, Web. 9 April 2014,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nationalstrategywildlifetrafficki
ng.pdf. The E.U. is also updating its Action Plan on Wildlife Trafficking in
response to the rising poaching rates and illegal trade in wild animals. E.U.
Consultation on Wildlife Trafficking, EUROPA (Feb. 7, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/
unitedkingdom/press/frontpage/2014/14_10_en.htm.European Commission, EU
Consultation on Wildlife Trafficking, 2 February 2014, Web. 9 April 2014,
http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/press/frontpage/2014/14_10_en.htm.
250. John Kerry, Eric Holder & Sally Jewell, Opinion: End Illegal Wildlife
Trafficking on World Wildlife Day, DIPNOTE (Mar. 3, 2014), http://blogs.state.gov/
stories/2014/03/03/opinion-end-illegal-wildlife-trafficking-world-wildlife-day.
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are at the risk of extinction. 251 Whales continue to be killed in large
numbers despite a commercial whaling moratorium since 1986. 252
Lastly, there are only 20,000 to 25,000 polar bears left in the wild
and their numbers in some populations are steadily declining due to
habitat loss caused by climate change and overutilization of
international commercial trade. 253
Third, TTIP must include strong trade-based measures against
IUU fishing, such as a ban on products from States found to be
undermining fishery conservation, and a commitment to implement
stronger enforcement measures of penalties for engaging in IUU
fishing. The global illegal catching of fish amounts to an estimated
ten billion to twenty-three billion dollars annually. 254 Illegal fishing
compromises sustainable fisheries and thus TTIP must drive higher
international standards on this issue. Both the E.U. and the United
States have already taken steps to address illegal fishing, but more
must be done. 255
251. James A. Foley, IUCN Group Says 25% of All Sharks and Rays
Threatened with Extinction, NATURE WORLD NEWS (Jan. 21, 2014),
http://www.natureworldnews.com/articles/5727/20140121/iucn-group-25-sharksrays-threatened-extinction.htm.
252. Commercial Whaling, INT’L WHALING COMM’N, https://iwc.int/
commercial (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
253. On the Precipice: Why International Commercial Trade in Polar Bears
Should Be Eliminated, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL (2012), http://www.nrdc.org/
wildlife/cites/polar-bear/files/polar-bear-OV.pdf.
254. IUU Fishing- Frequently Asked Questions, NOAA FISHERIES,
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/iuu/faqs.html (last visited Feb 7, 2015).
255. The E.U. is the world’s largest importer of fish and fishery products with
imports estimated at forty-seven billion dollars for 2012, which is approximately
thirty-six percent of global fish imports. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 50 (2014),
available at http://www.fao.org/3/d1eaa9a1-5a71-4e42-86c0-f2111f07de16/i3720
e.pdf [hereinafter FAO REPORT 2014]. The E.U. has taken significant steps to
combat IUU fishing. For example, in 2008, the E.U. passed Council Regulation
(EC) No 1005/200 (“IUU Regulation”) to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing
and implemented it in 2010. The IUU Regulation aims to “ensure that any
individual or business wishing to import fish and fish products into the E.U. can
only do so if the country under whose flag the fish was caught can show that it has
in place, and enforces, laws and regulations to conserve and manage its marine
resources.” FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF WORLD
FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 94 (2010), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/
013/i1820e/i1820e.pdf [hereinafter FAO REPORT 2010]. As the world’s second
largest importer of fish and fishery products with imports estimated at 17.5 billion
dollars for 2012 (approximately 13.6 percent of global fish imports), the United
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The TTIP environment chapter must also be subject to dispute
settlement mechanisms, as has been the practice for U.S. FTAs in the
past. E.U. environment provisions, on the other hand, have not been
binding. 256 Therefore, it will be up to the United States to ensure that
it negotiates a chapter with strong dispute settlement provisions and
for the E.U. to agree to these terms.
iii. TTIP SPS Chapter and Animal Welfare
Animal protection groups are advocating for the TTIP to
incorporate robust provisions on farm animal welfare, and the wave
of favorable actions in trade of wildlife, such as the WTO seals
decision, may pave the way for progress in this area as public
opinion increasingly shifts toward humane treatment of animals
raised for food. 257 Farm animal welfare standards observed in the
E.U. during the production of agricultural products—such as in
housing, transport, and slaughter—are currently much higher than in
the United States. 258 For example, the E.U. bans and restricts the
most extreme confinement systems, including sow stalls, 259 battery
cages, 260 and veal crates. 261 By contrast, at the federal level, the
States has also taken serious steps to combat IUU fishing. FAO REPORT 2014,
supra note 255. Similar to the E.U. IUU Regulation, the United States has passed
the U.S. High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act. Driftnet Act
Amendments of 1990, 16 U.S.C. § 1826 (2006). The Act, later amended by the
Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act, “requires NOAA to identify countries that
have fishing vessels engaged in IUU fishing activities” and “[o]nce a nation has
been identified, [the United States] consult[s] with the nation to encourage
appropriate corrective action.” FAO REPORT 2010, supra note 255.
256. Trade and Sustainable Development: Initial EU Position Paper, supra
note 248, at 4.
257. See HUMANE SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL,TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND
INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP BRIEFING ON: FARM ANIMALS AND ANIMAL WELFARE
1 (June 2014).
258. Animal Welfare Main Community Legislative References, EUROPA,
http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/welfare/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2015)
(highlighting that animal welfare has been incorporated in all major treaties
affecting the functioning of the E.U., including the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the
1997 Amsterdam Treaty, and more recently, the Lisbon Treaty of 2009); see also
The EU and Animal Welfare: Policy Objectives, EUROPA, art. 13,
http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/welfare/policy/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
2015) (“[T]he Union and the Member States shall, since animals are sentient
beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals”).
259. Council Directive 2008/120/EC, 2008 O.J. (L 47/5) 5.
260. Council Directive 1999/74/EC, supra note 3.
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United States has only one regulation that protects animals at the
time of slaughter 262 and another that limits the amount of time that
animals may spend in transit to twenty-eight hours, whereas the E.U.
limits it to eight hours. 263 Only a few U.S. states have extreme
confinement bans. 264
Beyond imposing bans and restrictions, the E.U. has also
negotiated animal welfare provisions into its trade agreements, such
as the FTAs with Chile 265 and South Korea. 266 The SPS Chapter of
the E.U.-Chile FTA acknowledges that developing animal welfare
standards is important, especially given the relationship with
veterinary matters, and states that, “it is appropriate to include
[animal welfare] in this Agreement and to examine animal welfare
standards taking into account the development in the competent
international standards organizations.” 267 The SPS chapter of the
E.U.-Korea FTA “aims to enhance cooperation between the Parties
261. Council Directive 2008/119/EC, supra note 3.
262. Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1901 (2006) (requiring livestock be
rendered unconscious in a humane manner prior to slaughter). Significantly, the
U.S. Department of Agriculture has interpreted the Human Slaughter Act as not
applying to birds (including poultry), which accounts for approximately ninety-five
percent of all land animals raised for food in the United States. Wayne Pacelle,
This isn’t ‘Chicken Little’ Talk about USDA’s Poultry Slaughter Rules, A HUMANE
NATION (Apr. 10, 2014), http://blog.humanesociety.org/wayne/2014/04/this-isntchicken-little-talk-about-usdas-poultry-slaughter-rules.html
263. Twenty-Eight Hour Law of 1873, 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (1994) (stating that
transporters may not confine animals in a vehicle or vessel for more than twentyeight consecutive hours without unloading for feeding, water, and rest); see also
Council Regulation 1/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 3) 1 (requiring similar confinement
restrictions after eight hours of transport).
264. EU and US Farm Animal Welfare Legislation, HUMANE SOC’Y INT’L (July
10, 2014), available at http://www.hsi.org/assets/pdfs/ttip_briefing_eu_vs_us.pdf
(noting that Florida, Arizona, Oregon, Colorado, California, Maine, Michigan,
Ohio, and Rhode Island no longer allow or are phasing out use of gestation crates;
Arizona, Colorado, California, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Ohio, and Rhode
Island ban the use of veal crates; Michigan, Oregon, and Washington restrict the
use of battery cages; only California bans the sale of eggs from battery cage
facilities; and California, Ohio, Rhode Island, and New Jersey ban tail docking of
cattle).
265. Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Community
and its Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Chile, of the Other
Part, 2002 O.J. 3 [hereinafter E.U.-Chile FTA].
266. Countries and Regions: South Korea, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/
policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-korea/ (last updated Sept. 2014).
267. E.U.-Chile FTA, supra note 265.
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on animal welfare issues, taking into consideration various factors
such as livestock industry conditions of the Parties.” 268 The E.U.
draft proposal for the TTIP SPS chapter was leaked on July 2014 269
and revealed that the E.U. aims to include an article 270 on animal
welfare within the chapter, although only the final text will reveal the
ultimate outcome.
The initial U.S. position has been that animal welfare is not an
issue that the SPS chapter should address because it is not a food
safety issue, especially given the arguments from the agricultural
industry that food can be safe for consumers whether or not an
animal is raised in extreme confinement. 271 However, there are
scientific studies indicating that animal health and welfare are linked
because poor welfare conditions can render animals more susceptible
to disease. 272 E.U. and U.S. diverging regulations on animal welfare
are concerning because it means that E.U. farmers and their products
are held to one standard of animal treatment, while products
imported from the United States may be held to a lower standard. 273
One alternative is that animal welfare may be addressed in other
parts of TTIP beyond the SPS chapter, such as the chapter on
agricultural market access or the TBT chapter. Support for this lies in

268. E.U.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement, art. 5.1, E.U.-South Korea,
Sept. 16, 2010, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:201
1:127:FULL&from=EN [hereinafter E.U.-South Korea FTA].
269. TTIP Textual Proposal- Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153026.pdf (last visited
Apr. 8, 2015).
270. Id. Article 11 of the proposal draft calls on the parties to recognize animal
sentience; undertake to exchange information, expertise and experiences in animal
welfare; strengthen research collaboration in this area; collaborate in international
for a in the aim of promoting development of good animal welfare practices; and
appoint a working group on implementation of these provisions if necessary. Note
for the Attention of the Trade Policy Committee, TTIP – Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Issues – Draft SPS Chapter, art. 11, DS 1292/14 (June 27, 2014),
available at http://www.iatp.org/files/2014.07_TTIP_SPS_Chapter_0.pdf
[hereinafter EU-U.S. TTIP Negotiations].
271. A position expressed by USTR representatives during public TTIP
stakeholder rounds, as documented by this article’s author, Maria Kalinina.
272. Broiler Stocking Density and Welfare, 6 POULTRY PERSPECTIVES, no. 1,
2005, at 2, available at http://extension.udel.edu/factsheet/wp-content/uploads/20
12/09/Stocking-Density_Litter-Quality-and-Poultry-Welfare-2005.pdf.
273. EU and US Farm Animal Welfare Legislation, supra note 264.
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the fact that WTO has recognized public morals as a legitimate
objective pursuant to the WTO TBT Agreement.
iv. TTIP and Animal Testing and Research
Millions of animals are used in laboratory research and product
testing throughout the world. 274 Many methods used are outdated and
can be replaced with cutting-edge non-animal techniques. TTIP
offers an opportunity to address two specific issues in this field: (1)
the use of animals in product testing, including testing of
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, plant protection products, biocides and
chemicals and (2) the protection of animals used in laboratories. 275
Animal protection groups advocate for the parties to incorporate
rigorous application of the ‘3Rs’ (Replacement, Reduction and
Refinement of animal use) into the TTIP to improve welfare
standards and reduce test data requirements, which could ensure that
parties use alternatives to animal testing whenever possible. 276
In addressing the use of animals in product testing, the E.U. has
made great progress in passing regulation that substantially reduces
animal testing by banning animal testing for cosmetics, introducing
non-animal methods for vaccine batch testing, and reducing use of
animals involved in chemical safety assessments as part of the
“REACH” regulation. 277 The United States has made similar progress
274. About Animal Testing, HUMAN SOC’Y INT’L, http://www.hsi.org/
campaigns/end_animal_testing/qa/about.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
275. EMILY MCIVOR, TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP
BRIEFING ON: ANIMAL TESTING (2014).
276. Id.
277. On pesticides, Regulations 528/2012, 283/2013, and 284/2013 reduce
testing on animals by up to fifty percent in some cases. European Union
Legislation on Plant Protection Products and Biocidal Products, EUROPA,
http://exporthelp.europa.eu/update/requirements/ehir_eu14_03v001/eu/auxi/eu_che
mkt_leg_ppp_bp.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2015); see Council Regulation
1223/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 342/59) (EC) (banning animal testing for cosmetics
within the E.U.). On vaccine batch testing, E.U. vaccine regulators have pioneered
a novel safety assessment strategy called “consistency approach” which may
replace in vivo tests. See The Vaccines Consistency Approach Project, EUROPA,
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/epaa/platform-regulation/vaccines/vaccinesconsistency_en.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). On chemicals, the “REACH”
Regulations 1907/2006 has numerous measures to minimize new animal testing,
but some animal testing requirements remain and are redundant. Council
Regulation 1907/2006, 2007 O.J. (L 136/3) (EC). Finally, on pharmaceuticals,
progress toward minimization of animal testing has been achieved via International
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with some matters, such as pesticides, but lags behind the E.U. with
other matters, such as not permitting cosmetic testing on animals. 278
As for animals used in research, E.U.’s Directive 2010/63/EU on the
protection of animals used for scientific purposes is the first of its
kind, extending legal protections to a larger range of species and
requiring application of the 3Rs. 279
TTIP parties can build on animal testing language in existing
FTAs to show leadership in promoting advanced non-animal
techniques in safety-testing and research. 280 For example, the E.U.South Korea FTA already includes text in an annex on chemicals that
confirms the shared objective of the parties to “promot[e] alternative
methods for assessment of hazards of substances and reduc[e] animal
testing.” 281 TTIP provides an additional opportunity for the parties to
improve exchanges of regulatory data on pharmaceuticals, cooperate
to advance approaches that do not require testing each batch of
vaccines on animals, establish a process for timely updates of
toxicological risk assessments, and facilitate exchange of data and
cost information between chemical companies, among other areas. 282

c. TTIP, Regulatory Cooperation, and ISDS
The United States and E.U. plan to include a horizontal regulatory
cooperation chapter in the TTIP that would apply across the entire
Conference on Harmonization. Yasuo Ohno, ICH Guidelines—Implementation of
the 3Rs (Retirement, Reduction, and Replacement): Incorporating Best Scientific
Practices into the Regulatory Process, 43 ILAR J. 595, 596-97 (2002),
http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/cosmetic_testing/qa/questions_answers.html
(last visited Apr. 8, 2015)
278. Fact Sheet: Cosmetic Testing, HUMANE SOCIETY, http://www.humane
society.org/issues/cosmetic_testing/qa/questions_answers.html
279. Council Directive 2010/63/EU, supra note 3.
280. Troy Seidle, Dir., Research & Toxicology Dept., Humane Soc’y Int’l,
Enhancing Alignment in Assessment Approaches for Chemical and Product Safety
7 (Oct. 1, 2014) (available upon request) (advocating for a “process for the timely
updating of toxicological assessment to optimize science-based decision making
and regulatory alignment” in different industry sectors, such as vaccines,
chemicals, and pharmaceuticals).
281. E.U.-South Korea FTA, supra note 268, Annex 2-E, ¶ 2(d).
282. Seidle, supra note 280, at 7.
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agreement. The E.U.’s Chief Negotiator, Ignacio Garcia Bercero, has
articulated two goals for this chapter:
The first is increasing cooperation between United States and E.U.
regulators in order to avoid unnecessary conflicts in their regulations and
help set a global standard for the development of regulations . . . The
second common goal is that stakeholders have an important input in the
regulatory process, “taking into account the legal and institutional
framework of each side.” 283

The United States, in part, has suggested that regulatory
cooperation in the TTIP adopt certain elements that are similar to the
U.S. notice-and-comment process 284 and cost-benefit analysis. 285
However, many civil society groups have described the U.S. noticeand-comment process and cost-benefit analysis as severely broken
because they delay the passage of critical consumer protections,
primarily serve the interests of big industry, and can leave
regulations open to legal challenge. 286 The European Commission
initially “rejected that proposal as politically unfeasible in the E.U.,
but the negotiators’ comments seemed to signal that the two sides
may be pursuing a potential compromise.” 287
The greatest concern for regulatory cooperation in TTIP is that it
would mean “procedures could easily facilitate a roll-back of
protection provided by existing legislation, and that they would
likely impede the development of new legislation and the
implementation of what currently exists.” 288 It is unclear how U.S.
283. EU TTIP Negotiator Sees Advances on Sectoral, Horizontal Regulatory
Goals, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (May 29, 2014).
284. “Long Way to Go” on Regulatory Cooperation Talks in TTIP—EU
Official, BORDERLEX ¶ 6 (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.borderlex.eu/long-way-goregulatory-cooperation-talks-ttip-eu-official/ (describing the notice and comment
process as a system in which “regulators are legally obliged to take into account
comments filed by the public) .
285. De Gucht Proposal for TTIP Regulatory Effort Contrasts with Froman’s,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Oct. 29, 2013).
286. Letter from Civil Society Groups to Michael Froman, Ambassador, U.S.
Trade Representative, and Karl De Gucht, Comm’r for Trade, European Comm’n
(May 12, 2014), available at http://sensiblesafeguards.org/assets/documents/regcosign-on-letter_questions_final.pdf [hereinafter May 12, 2014 Letter to Michael
Froman and Karl De Gucht].
287. EU TTIP Negotiator Sees Advances on Sectoral, Horizontal Regulatory
Goals, supra note 283.
288. May 12, 2014 Letter to Michael Froman and Karl De Gucht, supra note
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and E.U. regulators will develop higher standards on wildlife
protections, animal welfare, and animal testing and research, if the
regulatory coherence process favors big business and their interests,
which are represented by lobbyists whose purpose is to limit such
regulation.
Lastly, the Investor-State Dispute Settlement is another
contentious section of TTIP because it has previously served
corporate interests in challenging regulations that protected
consumer health. 289 ISDS has been included in multiple FTAs and
bilateral investment treaties and it “grants foreign corporations the
right to go before private trade tribunals and directly challenge
government policies and actions that corporations allege reduce the
value of their investments.” 290 It has been used in five hundred cases
against ninety-five governments, often challenging environmental
regulations and policies. 291 If the government loses, it must use
taxpayer resources to reimburse corporations. One of the most
famous cases involved Philip Morris which involved the company
bringing an ISDS challenge against Uruguay and Australia and
claiming that their plain packaging rules, which would eliminate
branding from cigarette packs as a public health measure,
undermined their investments. 292 ISDS poses a potential threat to
U.S. and E.U. laws and regulations that seek to protect wildlife and
increase welfare for farm animals and animals in product testing and
research.

286.
289. Christiane Gerstetter & Nils Meyer-Ohlendorf, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement under TTIP – A Risk for Environmental Regulation? ECOLOGIC INST. 4
(Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.ecologic.eu/sites/files/publication/2014/investor-statedispute-settlement-under-ttip-hbs.pdf.
290. Letter from Civil Society Groups to Michael Froman, Ambassador, U.S.
Trade Representative, and Karl De Gucht, Comm’r for Trade, European Comm’n
(Dec. 16, 2013), available at http://action.sierraclub.org/site/DocServer/TTIP_
Investment_Letter_Final.pdf?docID=14701.
291. Id.
292. Id.; see Philip Morris Asia Ltd v. Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12,
Notice of Claim (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012), http://www.italaw.com/cases/851;
Matthew C. Porterfield & Christopher R. Byrnes, Philip Morris v. Uruguay: Will
Investor-State Arbitration Send Restrictions on Tobacco Marketing Up in Smoke?,
INVEST. TREATY NEWS (July 12, 2011), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/philipmorris-v-uruguay-will-investor-state-arbitration-send-restrictions-on-tobaccomarketing-up-in-smoke/.
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IV.CONCLUSION
The most recent WTO decisions involving animals demonstrate
that the WTO is committed to the notion that animal welfare may
justify barriers to trade. Although the US-Tuna and EC-Seal
Products disputes concern attempts to protect wildlife, the Dispute
Settlement Body’s analysis is applicable in other animal-related
contexts, such as industrialized agriculture and scientific research. As
society’s abhorrence of the systematic mistreatment of animals in
industry rises to the level of a public moral concern, citizens will
increasingly pressure their governments to ensure that animals are
treated humanely by these industries. Countries should feel more
confident in taking trade-restrictive measures to protect animals so
long as such measures are designed and applied even-handedly.
With respect to global bilateral and multilateral trade, FTAs are
changing the way that governments and civil society think about
wildlife conservation and animal welfare. Trading partners are
imposing strict requirements upon one another regarding
enforcement of domestic and international environmental
protections, as well as efforts to combat illegal trade and habitat loss.
In addition, binding environment chapters with dispute mechanisms
give teeth to these critical conservation provisions for the first time.
Animal advocates are hopeful that this groundswell of enthusiasm
for the protection of wild animals will inspire negotiators to include
meaningful protections for animals beyond the environment
provisions. Given the E.U.’s progressive actions on behalf of farm
animal welfare and animal testing and research, such hope may be
rewarded in the TTIP negotiations. The recent successes in
addressing the increased harms to animals wrought by growing
international trade indicates that there is no better time than now for
animal advocates to push for greater protections in trade.

